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LAW, ENVIRONMENT, AND VISION
Douglas A. Kysar'
INTRODUCTION
[A]nalytic effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that
supplies the raw material for the analytic effort .... [T]his preanalytic cogni-
tive act will be called Vision.'
Environmental law rests uncomfortably between competing visions.
Once driven by essentially "moral, cultural, aesthetic, and political pur-
poses,"2 the environmental regulatory agenda now seems, like other aspects
of the emerging "cost-benefit state,"3 to be emphatically instrumentalist.
Although the environmental law framework established during the pre-
dominant ethical environmentalism of the 1970s remains largely intact,
4
commentators today agree that this framework represents "a failing para-
digm.",5 The future of environmental regulation, instead, lies in such effi-
ciency-oriented instruments as tradable permits, corrective taxes, disclosure
schemes, and other tools designed to replicate the conditions of a well-
functioning market. 6  Indeed, scholars have labeled tradable permits "the
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I JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 41 (1954).
2 MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 6 (1988).
3 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, at ix (2002) ("Gradually, and in fits and starts,
American government is becoming a cost-benefit state.").
4 See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21,
25 (2001).
5 Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. &
COM. 585 (1996).
6 See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 682 (1999) (noting consensus among analysts "that incentive-based instru-
ments such as taxes and tradeable allowances should generally be chosen over technology requirements
and fixed emissions standards because the incentive-based instruments are typically far more cost-
effective and innovation-generating than their alternatives").
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most fashionable innovation in environmental policy today,"7 promising not
only to achieve regulatory goals with less cost than traditional command-
and-control techniques, but also promising to inspire reasoned public delib-
eration regarding such weighty issues as the very type of environment in
which we desire to live.8
As Lisa Heinzerling argues, however, the "republican moment"9 prom-
ised by tradable permit schemes has proven stubbornly elusive, at least if
experience with the sulfur dioxide trading program created by the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments is indicative. ° According to proponents of
tradable permit schemes, enacting such legislation forces explicit discussion
by lawmakers and their constituents regarding the goals of environmental
protection due to the fact that such schemes require the government to es-
tablish an aggregate limit to the amount of pollution emitted or resources
used in a given time period."I Yet, as Heinzerling's study of the legislative
history of the Clean Air Act Amendments reveals, no such public discus-
sion took place with regard to the sulfur dioxide trading program.'" Instead,
Congress devoted nearly all of its attention to allocating valuable property
rights created under the scheme among clamoring interest groups. 3 In
other words, Congress fixated on dividing up the pork.
This Article argues that the failure of existing environmental trading
programs to inspire serious democratic deliberation about environmental
goals is caused in no small part by a fundamental conceptual flaw in our
background assumptions about the natural world and its relation to our eco-
nomic activity. Specifically, because mainstream economic accounts gen-
erally fail to recognize absolute limits imposed by nature on the ability of
humans to appropriate and utilize natural resources, they also fail to provide
an adequate conceptual basis on which to make the political judgments re-
7 Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 301 (1995);
see also Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled
Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 45, 51-52 (1999) (noting that tradable permits are "a matter of considerable interest in global
environmentalism").
8 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv.
1333, 1341-51 (1985); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 178-88 (1988); Richard B. Stew-
art, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 353-54 (1990); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling En-
vironmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 158-62 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 634-40 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Democratiz-
ing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 949, 964-66 (1991).
9 James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Con-
stitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. Rev. 287 (1990).
10 See Heinzerling, supra note 7. The trading program is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o
(2000).
11 See sources cited supra note 8.
12 Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 319-28.
3 See id. at 328-32.
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quired by tradable permit schemes. Just as cost-benefit analysis seems in-
coherent under the moral absolutism of 1970s-era environmental statutes, 14
setting aggregate limits to annual sulfur dioxide emissions appears nonsen-
sical, or at least not urgent, within a theoretical model that recognizes no ul-
timate constraints to economic growth.
Fortunately, an alternative vision exists: ecological economics. Dur-
ing the shift to efficiency-oriented environmental regulation, legal scholars
have paid little attention to this emerging academic field that seeks to bring
multidisciplinary rigor to the study of nature's role within human economic
production." By fusing insights from ecology, population biology, and
physics with the theoretical framework of economics, ecological econo-
mists attempt to. provide a more nuanced understanding of human-
ecosystem interactions than those offered independently by either econo-
mists or conservationists. Significantly, ecological economists rely on a
preanalytic vision of human activity that is presumed to be bounded by
natural constraints. This vision, or worldview, provides a simple yet sur-
prisingly radical departure from mainstream economic thought.16  It also
provides the basis for an alternative conception of the goals of collective
governance, one that brings much-needed coherence to environmental deci-
sionmaking within the paradigm of market-based regulation.
Part I reviews in more detail the case for adopting ecological econom-
ics as a theoretical model for legal analysis. Part II then examines a series
of specific areas of law and regulation in which ecological economic in-
sights can inform the choice of rules or polices. One goal of this Article is
to demonstrate that ecological economics can be, and to a large extent al-
ready has been, operationalized through concrete regulatory proposals. In-
deed, many of the policy tools reviewed in Part II will be familiar to those
14 See infra text accompanying notes 129-34.
is See AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 5 (Robert Costanza et al. eds., 1997)
("[Ecological economics] is a return to a point when economies and other sciences were integrated
rather than academically isolated as they are now."). The legal academy has not completely ignored the
development of ecological economics. Jeff Lewin provided an early exception in an essay exploring the
implications of the field for law and economics. See Jeff L. Lewin, Toward a New Ecological Law &
Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 249 (Robin Paul Malloy &
Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995). More recently, James Salzman, Barton Thompson, Jr., and others
have devoted considerable energy to the project of acknowledging and analyzing the concept of ecosys-
tem services, a notion that features prominently in the ecological economic literature. See James
Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 893 (1997); James Salzman et. al., Pro-
tecting Ecosystem Services: Science. Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. REv. 309, 327 (2001)
(introducing symposium issue devoted to the topic of "ecosystem services"); Barton H. Thompson, Jr,
Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2000). Additionally, in an earlier
work, I have argued for the adoption of ecological economics as a general macroeconomic model for
legal analysis. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of
Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001).
16 See HERMAN E. DALY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND THE ECOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 50 (1999)
(noting that when one adopts the ecological economic vision, "[e]conomic logic stays the same, but the
perceived pattern of scarcity changes radically and policies must be changed radically").
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conversant in the environmental law literature. The additional contribution
that this Article seeks to make is to reexamine those proposals in light of
the integrative vision provided by ecological economics. As a conse-
quence, the tenor of the following discussion may at times seem highly,
perhaps even excessively, theoretical. This is not an accident. The central
premise of this Article is that environmental law does not suffer from a lack
of well-designed, well-studied policy tools to achieve its goals, but rather
from a lack of urgency among policymakers and the public concerning the
necessity to achieve those goals. Such urgency simply does not follow
from a preanalytic worldview in which nature is assumed to be boundless.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
In early 2001, Daimler Chrysler A.G. began marketing a four-wheel
drive vehicle so massive in dimension and weight that it must comply with
federal regulations applicable to eighteen-wheel trucks. 7 The vehicle,
called The Unimog by Daimler, is three feet taller than the tallest sport-
utility vehicle, nearly two feet wider than a typical car, and one foot longer
than the Ford Excursion, the longest sport utility previously available on the
consumer market. It weighs 12,500 pounds, a heft equal to "more than two
Chevrolet Suburban sport utility vehicles or four Toyota Camry sedans."' 8
The Unimog averages only ten miles per gallon of diesel fuel and is re-
stricted from traveling on some roads and bridges because it exceeds local
weight and height limits. Nevertheless, Daimler offers the vehicle to afflu-
ent suburbanites, whether they are off-road enthusiasts or simply "moms
[who] want to take it to the grocery store."' 19
The Unimog provides an apt symbol of the debate between ecological
economists and their more conventional counterparts. Most economists to-
day would recognize that the Unimog produces a variety of negative exter-
nality problems. Its poor fuel efficiency, to give just one example,
highlights the contribution of petroleum-powered vehicles to global climate
change through the emission of greenhouse gases.20 Thus, in order to en-
sure that the Unimog represents a welfare-enhancing use of society's re-
sources, prevailing economic theory would require that it (and all other
vehicles) bear a tax representing the uncounted costs of pollution caused by
the vehicle's production and use.2'
Beyond using Pigouvian taxes to address pollution externalities, how-
17 Keith Bradsher, Daimler To Offer a Monster S. U. V, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2001, at Cl.
18 Id. at C1I, C4.
19 Id. (quoting Bruce Barnes, marketing manager for the Unimog).
20 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 299,
300 (2000).
21 See infra note 61. Alternatively, one might attempt to correct for the externality by creating en-
forceable property rights in the atmosphere, such that private owners would have an incentive to bargain
for pollution reductions from those who threaten the stability of their resource. See infra note 62.
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ever, most conventional economists would not be concerned whether petro-
leum-based plastics, metals, and other nonrenewable resources required to
produce the six-and-a-half ton behemoth should be preserved by society for
future applications. Nor would they be particularly concerned that the
Unimog's marketing materials reflect a culture of competitive consumption
that may waste scarce resources in a sort of S.U.V. "arms race. '22 Such
considerations would not figure prominently in the conventional econo-
mist's analysis of the Unimog because, so long as the price of the vehicle
internalizes tangible external costs, one would have little reason to believe
that its natural capital components could be allocated to other, more benefi-
cial uses, either currently or in the future.
Ecological economists, on the other hand, believe that those excluded
considerations raise vital issues of intra- and intergenerational resource dis-
tribution. A pollution tax on the Unimog would be a good start, according
to the ecological economists, but it hardly would answer the more funda-
mental question of how to ensure that humanity equitably distributes its fi-
nite endowment of natural capital within and across generations. Indeed,
ecological economists might well view the Unimog as emblematic of a
wasteful society that forsakes its obligations to the future in exchange for a
present, but ephemeral natural resource binge. Although the makers of the
Unimog assure customers that "[w]anting to conquer the great outdoors is
simply not a good reason to give up . . . air conditioning,"23 ecological
economists would argue that there are other, more theoretically sound rea-
sons to forego both.
This Part provides a brief overview of the conceptual disagreement be-
tween conventional and ecological economists-a debate that raises far-
reaching questions concerning sustainability, distribution, and the macro-
economic analysis of law.24 Readers should be warned both that the discus-
sion focuses on these two theoretical paradigms at a highly abstract level
and that the actual state of contemporary environmental regulation bears lit-
tle relationship to either paradigm.25 This theoretical focus serves an impor-
tant purpose, however, because it is arguably at the level of theory that
more intellectual development is needed. As will be seen in Part II, both
mainstream and ecological economists have devoted considerable insight
22 The Unimog's sales brochure opens with the following challenge:
There are a lot of vehicles out there playing at being 4X4's. They're small. Usually they're cute
And sometimes, instead of going to the mall or the grocery store, they actually go off road. But
you want a real all-terrain vehicle. One built to take everything you and nature can throw at it.
You want a Unimog.
Freightliner Unimog, You Don't Need Roads When You Can Make Your Own (sales brochure on file
with author). The brochure continues with a diagram of the Unimog depicting "what S.U.V.'s and other
so-called 4X4's will see as you drive by." Id.
23 Freightliner Unimog, supra note 22.
24 For a more thorough treatment, see Kysar, supra note 15.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 129-34.
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and energy to the project of devising practical, market-based policy tools to
implement environmental regulatory goals. These tools have been thor-
oughly analyzed and promise workable solutions to concrete problems. The
real mystery therefore would seem to lie in society's failure to employ them
on a wider and more confident basis to combat widely acknowledged exter-
nalities. The discussion that follows attempts to explain that omission by
identifying areas of tension in the competing preanalytic visions of ecologi-
cal and conventional economics.
A. Preanalytic Vsion and the Emergence of Ecological Economics
Conventional economists often state that growth of human economic
production is not checked by restrictions imposed by nature.2 6  In other
words, they treat the human economic process as an open system that draws
resources and emits wastes through a relatively undefined and unexamined
relationship with nature. In contrast, ecological economists view the means
of production and nature as components of the same closed system.27 On
this account, the human economic process faces hard constraints imposed
by the absolute or temporal scarcity of nonrenewable resources and renew-
able resources, as well as by the limited capacity of ecological mechanisms
to absorb the pollution produced by exploitation of those resources. As a
consequence of such constraints, society must remain cognizant of the ex-
tent and quality of existing resource stocks, as well as the capacity for natu-
ral systems to absorb waste outputs created during the transformation of
those stocks into human goods.
In a 1966 article entitled The Economics of the Coming Spaceship
Earth,28 economist Kenneth Boulding first identified the competing preana-
lytic visions that form the heart of the present schism between conventional
and ecological economists. In Boulding's view, mainstream economics re-
flected the notion of the "cowboy economy, '29 in which natural frontiers are
seen as limitless, resources inexhaustible, and wastes innocuous. Under
such a conception, increases in the sheer volume of economic activity, as
26 Specifically, economists typically accept a Cobb-Douglas production function in which nature
and man-made capital are treated as substitutes. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS 519-20 (16th ed. 1998). In that manner, although specific types of natural inputs can in
fact become scarce or depleted, no general scarcity of natural resources can constrain economic growth
See, e.g., ROBERT M. SOLOW, AN ALMOST PRACTICAL STEP TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 8-9 (1992) ("It
is of the essence that production cannot take place without some use of natural resources. But I shall
also assume that it is always possible to substitute greater inputs of labor, reproducible capital [e.g.,
technology], and renewable resources for smaller direct inputs of the fixed resource.").
27 See DALY, supra note 16, at xii (noting that the "distinguishing characteristic [of ecological eco-
nomics] is that it sees the economy as a subsystem of a larger ecosystem that is finite, non-growing, and
materially closed, while open to a flow-through (throughput) of solar energy that is also finite and non-
growing").
28 Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, reprinted in VALUING THE
EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 297 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993).
29 Id. at 303.
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measured by gross domestic product (GDP), would appear to be a logical
and defensible goal for society to adopt.31 In other words, if there are no
significant environmental or social repercussions to economic growth, then
society should rather uncontroversially pursue growth as a means of in-
creasing the total amount of wealth available for distribution among its
members.
Boulding contrasted the cowboy economy with a "spaceman econ-
omy," 31 in which the earth is seen as a closed system necessitating careful
focus on the consequences of human economic activity. Once humanity
nears the maximum sustainable biological limit or carrying capacity of the
"Spaceship Earth, '312 it must value resource flows qualitatively, with spe-
cific reference to their ability to become enduring, efficient, and useful
capital stocks, rather than simply value them quantitatively as an assumed
proxy for increasing human welfare. As Boulding put it, "[t]he essential
measure of the success of the economy is not production and consumption
at all, but the nature, extent, quality, and complexity of the total capital
stock, including in this the state of the human bodies and minds included in
the system."33 Focusing on the sheer magnitude of income flows jeopard-
izes the environment on which humanity ultimately depends and, in any
event, provides only an indirect indicator of social welfare by equating ma-
terial progress with human progress.
Boulding's vision of the earth as a closed system received scientific
support in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's application of theoretical physics
to economics.34 By illustrating how the laws of thermodynamics govern the
use of resources within economic processes, Georgescu-Roegen provided a
scientific explanation for Boulding's commonsense view that natural re-
sources are limited: such resources are limited because their use necessarily
entails their dissipation. According to the Second Law of Thermodynam-
ics, matter-energy irrevocably moves from a condition of low- to high-
entropy or from ordered, available energy to chaotic, unavailable energy.
Thus, in terms of matter-energy conservation, "the cost of any biological or
economic enterprise is always greater than the product. '35 For economics,
the theoretical implication of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is fun-
damental. Rather than isolated as an exchange loop capable of perpetual
expansion, the economic process must be viewed as fixed to a base of mate-
rials that inevitably tends to exhaustion in the long run.
30 See id. at 303-04 ("It there are infinite reservoirs from which material can be obtained and into
which effluvia can be deposited, then the throughput is at least a plausible measure of the success of the
economy.").
31 Id. at 303.
32 Id. at 297.
33 Id. at 304.
34 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem (Univ. of Ala., Dis-
tinguished Lecture Series No. 1, 1971), reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH, supra note 28, at 75
35 Id. at 80.
97:675 (2003)
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Just as Boulding's and Georgescu-Roegen's early works provided the
intellectual foundation of ecological economics, Garrett Hardin's famous
1968 article The Tragedy of the Commons3 6 provided the discipline's trans-
disciplinary focus. The basic theme of Hardin's article had been well ex-
plored over a decade earlier by an economist.37 Both authors focused on the
collective action problem posed by resources that are open to exploitation
by any member of society without social, legal, or other forms of constraint.
Hardin's eloquent article had a more far-reaching impact, however, pre-
cisely because his approach was not restricted to a purely economic inquiry.
Rather, he fused his elementary economic reasoning with insights from bi-
ology, philosophy, and sociology. Thus, Hardin's article encouraged the
type of transdisciplinary thinking that uniquely has characterized ecological
economics in the decades following its publication.
Subsequent authors have seriously challenged Hardin's notion that
commons dilemmas can be solved only through legislative controls 38; nev-
ertheless, his enduring contribution has been to demonstrate the sheer per-
vasiveness of commons dilemmas. For many, the collective action problem
had been seen as a relatively minor behavioral exception to the general rule
of allocative market efficiency.39 In Hardin's view, however, the commons
tragedy was pervasive, and helped to explain a host of urgent contemporary
problems, such as the extinction of marine life,40 the pollution of air and
water,41 and the rapid growth of the human population. 42 In this regard,
Hardin transformed the tragedy of the commons from a curious anomaly to
a more fundamental problem that necessitated a wholesale rethinking of the
conventional economic model. In many respects, the discipline of ecologi-
cal economics can be seen as an attempt to fill the theoretical vacuum cre-
ated by Hardin's recognition of the ubiquity of collective action problems.
36 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
37 H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
38 In his article, Hardin called for "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the
people affected" to circumvent the tragedy. Hardin, supra note 36, at 1247. Many subsequent commen-
tators have critiqued this recommendation for ignoring alternative, less coercive approaches. See, e.g.,
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990) (reviewing examples of common property regimes in which commons dilemmas are
controlled by communal management, rather than formal legislation or individual ownership); Rose, su-
pra rote 7, at 71-72 (noting that Hardin failed to observe both norm-driven solutions such as common
property regimes and hybrid-property solutions such as tradable permits).
39 Cf David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsid-
ered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 25-26 (1998) ("Current law mirrors the view of most economists that
environmental externalities are an inconvenient theoretical contaminant in an otherwise elegant market
system. Externalities are only an afterthought in a legal system driven by an individual/market oriented
paradigm.").
40 Hardin, supra note 36, at 1245.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1246.
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Building on these early contributions, economist Herman Daly has de-
voted his career to providing a more formal theoretical framework for ana-
lyzing the intersection of ecological and anthropic spheres. Most
fundamentally, he recognized the concept of "scale," which refers roughly
to "the physical scale or size of the human presence in the ecosystem, as
measured by population times per capita resource use."'43 Theoretically, so-
ciety may pursue an entire range of scales, including ones so minimalist in
their resource use as to inappropriately deprive humans of present utility,
and ones so profligate in their consumption as to jeopardize the very future
of the species. Daly holds the position that the optimal scale of the human
economy is a sustainable one.44 That is, as a normative matter, govern-
ments should regulate the scale of the economy so that it requires no more
resources or produces no more wastes than can be regenerated or absorbed,
respectively, by the environment. In this manner, governments can provide
future generations with an ecological context that, at least theoretically, will
continue to support present standards of living.
B. Scale as an Independent Concept
An obvious rebuttal to the contentions of ecological economists is to
point out that GDP can increase, and often has increased, without requiring
corresponding increases in the degree of resource use in the economy; hence,
infinite growth in GDP does not necessarily entail an unsustainable burden on
the environment.45 This argument, however, merely embraces the ecological
economist's goal of pursuing "development," defined as welfare enhance-
ments that do not entail increases in the economy's ecological burden, 46
rather than a less refined pursuit of economic growth without attention to its
ecological consequences. In previous eras, it may have been appropriate to
ignore the differences between growth and development on the assumption
that any increase in consumption, material or nonmaterial, was an improve-
ment in human welfare. In the "spaceman economy," however, it becomes
necessary to distinguish between those types of economic expansion that tax
the ecosystem more than the benefits they create and those that do not. In the
ecological economist's view, only the latter should be maximized.
For these reasons, Daly contends that scale should have a separate, for-
malized presence within the economic pantheon, just as wealth distribution
has an independent conceptual significance. 47 Markets, through their twin
43 HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 50 (1996).
44 Id. at 52 (noting that "[s]ustainability is probably the characteristic of optimal scale on which
there is most consensus").
45 See Mark Sagoff, Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics, 45 BIOSCI. 610, 614 (1995).
46 See DALY, supra note 43, at 69 ("[G]rowth in GNP [gross national product] ... is a conflation
of... two processes: (1) growth (physical increase) and (2) development (qualitative improvements
that allow more stock maintenance per unit of throughput, and more service per unit of stock).").
47 Id. at 51.
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devices of price information and economic incentives, are unparalleled in
their effectiveness at allocating resources efficiently. They do not, however,
resolve the altogether separate problems of achieving distributive justice and
ecological sustainability. Put differently, economists recognize that a Pareto-
optimal allocation of resources can be achieved with respect to any given dis-
tribution of income, including ones that might be described as unjust.48 Simi-
larly, a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources can be achieved with respect to
any given scale of the human economy, including ones that might lead to eco-
logical peril. "Ecological criteria of sustainability, like ethical criteria of Jus-
tice, are not served by markets. '49 Thus, Daly argues that "[o]ptimal scale,
like distributive justice, full employment, or price level stability, is a macro-
economic goal,"5 requiring unique macroeconomic policy instruments.
The tradable permit provides a helpful example of such instruments. As
noted above," economists have long recognized that uninhibited access to
fisheries presents a collective action problem that may lead to rapid and un-
sustainable depletion of fish populations. One policy tool well designed to
control such social traps is the tradable permit system.5" Governments first
determine the appropriate aggregate number of permits to issue in a given
year by referencing the best available scientific estimates of the maximum
sustainable yield from the fishery in question. Next, governments distribute
the fishing rights among their citizens according to essentially moral criteria
regarding the desirable distribution of property rights.5 3 Finally, governments
encourage trading of the fishing permits in order to ensure that they are em-
ployed in the most efficient manner possible. Thus, the simple policy instru-
ment of tradable permits forces separate judgments by lawmakers and
regulators regarding the sustainable scale of economic activity, the just distri-
bution of economic rights, and the efficient allocation of economic resources.
Of course, both conventional and ecological economists widely en-
dorse tradable permits for implementation of regulatory goals.14 The impor-
48 Amartya Sen provides the classic, if charged, formulation: "[A] society or an economy can be
Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting." AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 22 (1970).
49 DALY, supra note 43, at 32.
50 Id. at 51.
51 See supra text accompanying note 37.
52 See TOM TEITENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 296-300 (5th ed. 2000).
53 More realistically, governments attempt to navigate a treacherous sea of rent-seeking constitu-
ents. See infra note 56.
54 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 163-66 (1998) (describing academic support for "hybrid
property" solutions such as tradable permits to commons dilemmas); see also Richard B. Stewart, Envi-
ronmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2093-97 (1993) (arguing
for tradable emissions rights); James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449
(1994) (analyzing "hybrid property rights" for emission allowances); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stav-
ins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1991) (same).
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tant point, though, is that the conventional account still tends to view the
tragedy of the commons as an exception to the general rule that allocative
efficiency, coupled with some redistributive tax-and-transfer system, repre-
sents the entirety of what policymakers must monitor. For whatever reason,
a broader appreciation of scale has not flowed from recognition of "the
fisherman's problem."55 Yet the commons dilemma of open-seas fisheries
is simply an exceptionally sharp rendering of the problem of scale that
plagues every aspect of human economic activity. In the view of ecological
economists, society always faces a question of how much of an economic
activity to conduct, in addition to how efficiently it should be conducted
and how equitably the resulting economic gains should be distributed.
In the context of a renewable stock like fisheries, where the optimal
yield can be defined as a sustainable one, such judgments of scale seem trac-
table, perhaps even simple." In the context of more fundamental decisions
about optimally balancing the size of a population with its opportunities for
affluence, however, governments must face ethical judgments far more trou-
blesome than they have grown accustomed to resolving. The modern politi-
cal-economic means of pursuing distributive justice frequently has been to
increase "the size of the pie." 7 So long as policymakers and the public view
economic expansion as environmentally costless, the problem of inequitable
distribution can be kept at bay by the promise of individual opportunity
within a growing economy. At some point, however, ecological economists
argue that further growth in the scale of the economy will create more costs
than benefits and, hence, growth no longer will be available as a no-lose politi-
cal expedient to problems of inequitable resource distribution. Instead, society
will need to confront such problems directly, along with similarly troublesome
questions about population size, the other primary determinant of scale.
C. Ecological Economics as an Independent Methodology
A frequent and important counterargument to the contentions of eco-
logical economists is that, rather than being forced to confront such crush-
ing dilemmas, society instead can safely disregard the concept of scale
given that the market will self-correct for any ecological scarcities that hap-
pen to arise, whether as a consequence of human activity or not. According
to this account, as any good becomes scarce, markets signal its scarcity
through price increases, thereby prompting conservation efforts, techno-
55 See ARTHUR F. MCEvOY, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA
FISHERIES 1850-1980 (1986).
56 Of course, implementation of fishery permit systems may be complicated by interest group dis-
putes over the proper scientific estimate of the amount of permits to be issued and the political decision
of how to allocate the valuable property rights. See generally Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosys-
tem Management and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1997). As a theoreti-
cal matter, however, a diverse array of interested parties seem likely to agree that the optimal scale of
fishing activities is a sustainable one.
57 See DALY, supra note 43, at 5 1.
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logical innovations, recycling efforts, substitution, and other limit-avoiding
reactions.58 In this manner, and arguably consistent with the experience of
humanity to date,59 markets devise ingenious means of circumventing natu-
ral constraints such that legislated controls on the scale of the macroecon-
omy become unnecessary. This subpart reviews three counterarguments to
this belief in the self-correcting power of the market.
1. Externalities and the Limits of Knowledge.-First, ecological
economists hasten to point out that optimal human development will not be
achieved by reliance on market forces alone, given the number and variety
of environmental externalities that undermine the efficacy of the price
mechanism. For instance, the market may well produce "substitutes" for
breathable air when local environments become toxic. 60  That does not
mean, however, that polluted air and portable breathing devices are prefer-
able to the free intake of clean air. The market decisions eventually result-
ing in such a polluted state of affairs will not have taken account of the
costs of pollution along the way. Such systemic externalization renders
doubtful any reliance on the unfettered market to regulate the scale of the
human presence within the ecological universe.
Economists have long recognized that externalities can impede optimal
market outcomes in this manner. In the view of ecological economists,
however, the conventional responses to such market failures-adoption of
Pigouvian taxes61 or institution of Coasean property rights 62-- may not ade-
58 See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 1,8-9 (1974).
59 See generally BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST (2001) (reviewing an array
of empirical evidence suggesting that doomsday scenarios proffered by 1970s era environmentalists
have not come to pass).
60 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 53.
61 Generally speaking, Pigouvian tax schemes attempt to internalize costs by imposing a tax on the
activity that is seen as giving rise to the externality. In that manner, the taxed party can determine
whether its activity is cost-justified in light of the full social costs that the activity entails. See infra text
accompanying note 139.
62 One of Ronald Coase's important contributions was the insight that externalities result from a recip-
rocal relationship between two parties, rather than the activities of a singular party. See generally Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Thus, instead of taxing one party for the
amount of an externality, Coasean property rights schemes attempt to define property rights and reduce im-
pediments to bargaining, such that the affected parties themselves can decide whether to restrict activities
through private trading of the rights. See Stewart J. Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen
and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (1989). A related stream of literature argues that
such Coasean property rights solutions often will evolve naturally through market processes as technologies
develop to lower the cost of creating and enforcing property rights. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Ex-
change and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 14 (1964); Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Pap. and Proc. 1967); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill,
The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); GARY D.
LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991); Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property
Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2001).
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quately grapple with the type of externalities that humanity actually faces.
According to ecological economists, such policy instruments, although cer-
tainly preferable to a status quo of unexamined cost externalization, are
nevertheless insufficient by themselves to maintain human impact within
ecologically sustainable parameters, most critically because of the informa-
tional demands entailed by the regulatory approach. Although textbook
policy discussions may assume complete knowledge regarding the type of
environmental harm to be addressed, in reality physical scientists do not
purport to adequately understand ecosystem goods and services, either in
isolation or in their complex web of interdependence. 63  Without such
knowledge, both regulators designing environmental tax schemes and par-
ties attempting to bargain over property rights will be limited in their ability
to account for environmental harms.
Furthermore, what scientists do appear to know is that natural capital is
not destroyed or depleted in order of increasing importance to humanity.
To give just one example, humans may face immense costs from climate
change long before petroleum reserves are depleted. Such nonlinear natural
cost functions make the institution of internalizing tax schemes all the more
challenging for regulators. Similarly, parties attempting to coordinate Coa-
sean property-rights solutions to environmental externalities may face se-
vere difficulties in the timing of their bargaining. The externalized costs of
carbon emissions, for example, may escalate rapidly and dramatically as
complex environmental feedback loops become self-perpetuating. Scien-
tists speculate that incremental increases in ocean temperatures could even-
tually cross a threshold that would lead to the release of billions of tons of
trapped methane gas in polar ice cap regions, an event that could entail cli-
mate shifts on a massive scale. 64 Given the great uncertainty regarding such
predictions, individuals and entities affected by climate change may only sit
down to the bargaining table after atmospheric dynamics have reached a
point of irreversibility.
65
In addition to depending on adequate scientific knowledge, the imple-
mentation of environmental taxes also assumes that reliable mechanisms
exist for valuing ecosystem goods and services. One must, after all, trans-
form pollution and other externalities into some pecuniary value that is then
"internalized." But the manner, and indeed the propriety, of making such
calculations are far from uncontroversial. 66 Coasean property rights solu-
63 See Salzman et al., supra note 15, at 327.
64 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 2-3.
65 Moreover, for many of the most significant environmental dilemmas, property rights solutions
simply will be infeasible, either because the property rights themselves are incapable of enforcement or
because the parties affected by the relevant environmental externalities are unable to surmount massive
bargaining costs in order to ensure efficient allocation of property rights. See Terry L. Anderson &
Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 111, 128-30 (1998).
66 See Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 306-07.
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tions attempt to circumvent such constraints by putting the valuation deci-
sion into the hands of market actors. Yet the actors likely to face the most
severe consequences of environmental degradation, namely future genera-
tions, are not represented in the bargaining process.67 The most one can
hope is that some currently living market actors will express-through their
willingness to pay-their best judgment of what value future generations
will place on the environmental good or service. But surely that view re-
quires an unrealistic degree of altruism on the part of current market
participants.
In short, ecological economists believe that fine tuning the price
mechanism as a response to problems of scale "requires heroic assumptions
about our knowledge of the external costs resulting from ecosystem disrup-
tion, and how these costs are imputed to the micro decisions that gave rise
to them."68 As will be seen in Part II, many of the same critiques may be
made against ecological economics, once the discipline moves from theo-
retical debate to practical implementation. Nevertheless, a key advantage of
the transdisciplinary approach adopted by ecological economics is that it
remains keenly attuned to recognizing the circumstances under which such
difficult and imprecise valuation is required. That is, ecological economists
expect human economic activity to impact ecosystems in myriad unpredict-
able and significant ways. Such interactions are not viewed as an exception
to the theoretical model requiring ex post accommodation as an "externality."
Rather, they are central to the discipline's very existence.
2. Discounting as an Imperfect Proxy for Social Judgment.-A sec-
ond ecological economic response to the contention that markets will ade-
quately resolve scale dilemmas points out that some components of the
disutility caused by environmental externalities simply cannot, as a matter
of logic, be internalized by the price mechanism. With respect to Pigouvian
taxes, for instance, even assuming that ecologists, biologists, and physicists
could perfectly predict the environmental harms a particular market event
will cause, and that economists could perfectly monetize such harms in a
socially agreeable manner, the price mechanism still could not subsume the
fundamentally moral judgment that must be made with regard to environ-
mental harms imposed on future generations. When implementing an envi-
ronmental tax scheme, decisionmakers must not only measure harms
suffered by future generations, but they also must translate those harms into
a value that can be considered in the present. Such translation is typically
accomplished by determining algebraically the amount of money that would
need to be set aside today in order to accumulate, through compounded in-
terest, the full amount of the measured harm in the future. The necessity of
67 See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989).
68 DALY, supra note 43, at 54.
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choosing an appropriate discount rate for such calculation, however, im-
poses a logical roadblock to subsuming scale considerations within the
price mechanism. 69
For instance, government agencies often look to market rates for fi-
nancial instruments when selecting a discount rate for regulatory deci-
sionmaking.70 However, market rates of interest, like other forms of
price, are dependent on the initial distribution of property rights. Each
distribution of resources between generations determines a different effi-
cient allocation of resources, which in turn gives rise to a different set of
prices and interest rates.71 Thus, relying on market rates of interest to de-
termine questions of intergenerational resource distribution puts the con-
ceptual cart before the horse. Nor does the so-called "social discount
rate ' 72 avoid these problems. The social discount rate posits that society
first should determine an ethically appropriate rate of discounting and
then allow the selected rate to guide regulatory decisionmaking that im-
pacts future generations. Joseph Stiglitz expresses this position as fol-
lows: "[I]f the government correctly controlled the rate of interest (the
savings rate) then there would be no objection to the competitive determi-
nation of the rate of utilization of our natural resources." 73 No consensus
has emerged, however, regarding how the government can "correctly"
control the rate of interest.
Even if such a consensus did emerge, utilizing a social discount rate
would entail the same problem of conceptual bootstrapping as does relying
on market rates of interest. Society's judgment of the ethically appropriate
rate of discounting would no doubt change once it becomes known which
generation owns what resources. In other words, the set of distributive out-
comes determined by the previously agreed upon social discount rate would
necessitate a new rate, which would result in a new set of distributive out-
comes necessitating still another rate, and so on. Support for this proposi-
tion can be inferred from the intense debate that has in fact surrounded the
choice of an appropriate discount rate for use by federal agencies to reduce
future economic impacts of regulations to a present value for cost-benefit
69 See Lewin, supra note 15, at 274; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 39 (1999) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future]; Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental
Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE
L.J. 1911, 1915 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 947-48 (1999).
70 See Revesz, supra note 69, at 977-81.
71 See Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 88, 97-98 (Robert
Costanza ed., 1991).
72 Solow, supra note 58, at 10.
73 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: The Competitive Economy, 41
REV. ECON. STUD. 139, 139 (1974).
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analysis. 74 Broad academic or public agreement on an appropriate discount
rate may remain elusive precisely because, in many regulatory contexts, se-
lection of a discount rate seems trivial in comparison to the underlying dis-
tributive judgment that the discount rate is attempting to subsume. In other
words, faced with the question, "At what rate should future demand for
swordfish be discounted when using cost-benefit analysis to set harvest
rates?" many people likely would respond, "At whatever rate results in a
sustainable stock of swordfish." The fact that harvest rates are not set using
discounted future willingness to pay for fish75 demonstrates that, with re-
spect to the fishery at least, society has recognized that a distributive judg-
ment must logically precede the use of discounting to aid allocative
efficiency. Questions of intergenerational distribution, like questions of in-
tragenerational distribution, simply cannot be subsumed within the alloca-
tive function of the market.
Coasean property rights solutions, as traditionally understood, do not
circumvent this conceptual limitation. Under a Coasean scheme, private
owners still must make market decisions that have significant ramifications
for future generations, but they must make such decisions under the disci-
pline of market rates of interest.76 Any decision to defer resource consump-
74 In its role as overseer of cost-benefit analyses conducted by federal agencies, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget has suggested discount rates of ten and seven percent to reduce future harms and
benefits to present value. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-94, at 4 (1972) (ten percent); Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs;
Guidelines and Discounts, 57 Fed. Reg. 53519, 53523 (1992) (seven percent). As Lisa Heinzerling
notes, however, studies that attempt to estimate the social discount rate through market behavior, ex-
perimental surveys, the rate of return on financial instruments, and other methods achieve results that
range from as low as one half of one percent to as high as ninety percent. See Heinzerling, Discounting
Our Future, supra note 69, at 44. In short, "the correct discount rate is always a matter of controversy."
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-Post Incentive-
Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1234 n.307 (1998) (quoting WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE
COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS 8 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
75 Under the Magnuson and Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Congress ex-
pressly found that "[f]ishery resources are finite but renewable," and that "[i]f placed under sound man-
agement before overfishing has caused irreversible effects, the fisheries can be conserved and
maintained so as to provide optimum yields on a continuing basis." 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) (2000). Op-
timum yield is defined as "the maximum sustainable yield from [a given] fishery," adjusted as appropri-
ate for other "social, economic, or ecological factor[s]." Id. § 1802(28)(B). Slippage away from the
goal of sustainability is seemingly constrained by the proviso, "in the case of an overfished fishery, [op-
timum yield] provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield
in such fishery." Id. § 1802(28)(C). Thus, the Act makes a fairly unambiguous distributive judgment
that fishery stocks should be maintained at sustainable levels. The judgment is made directly: sustain-
ability is not contingent on the selection of an accommodating discount rate, but rather is made an ex-
press aim of the Act. The argument of ecological economists is that, not only fishery management
decisions, but all questions of intergenerational natural resource distribution should be made according
to this type of direct deliberation.
76 Economist Harold Hotelling made this point in one of the most enduring articles from natural re-
source economics. See Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON.
137 (1931).
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tion in favor of future generations must be weighed by the resource owner
against the return that proceeds from present consumption would generate
in alternative investments. Such a decisionmaking process, again, fails to
answer the logically prior question of how natural resources ought to be dis-
tributed across time to achieve intergenerational equity.
Ecological economists do believe that discounting can be an appropri-
ate means for determining how the present generation's resources should be
allocated to maximize the efficiency with which it uses those resources. 77
However, such allocation must take place separate from and subsequent to
collective social judgments regarding the distribution of resources between
generations. Using discounting as the method for achieving intergenera-
tional distributive equity opens all resources to present consumption by tak-
ing as given a state of distribution involving total ownership by the present
generation-the very question to be decided. For that reason, ecological
economists like Daly rely on modified Coasean policy instruments, such as
tradable permits, that make questions of intergenerational distribution and
sustainable scale explicit within the decisionmaking process. By setting
aggregate permit levels equal to the maximum sustainable yield from a
given fishery, for instance, policymakers make an openly normative judg-
ment that fish populations should be maintained at levels sufficient to en-
sure their continued availability to future generations. Such a judgment is
fundamentally market-determining, not market-determined. That is, the de-
cision to preserve fish populations depends directly on whether society
wants it to happen, not on whether the discount rate allows it to happen.
3. Individual Versus Collective Decisionmaking.-Finally, putting
aside the practical and logical difficulties of subsuming scale considerations
within the price mechanism or within private bargaining over property
rights, ecological economists argue that using either policy tool to regulate
scale remains an inappropriately individualistic mechanism for making
what is, unavoidably, a collective judgment. For instance, pure Coasean
property-rights solutions require private actors to assert their willingness to
pay to avoid environmental harms through market interactions. Yet for
many of the most pressing environmental issues, such bargaining necessar-
ily becomes collective in nature, given the numerous and diverse groups
that will be affected. At some point, the prospect of millions of people en-
gaging in private bargaining over environmental harms, such as global cli-
mate change, becomes indistinguishable from public lawmaking.
Similarly, Pigouvian tax schemes often seem stretched beyond reason
when applied to environmental issues with potentially worldwide, long-term,
irreversible effects. In the global warming context, for instance, such an ideal
tax would require some more or less contrived means of polling present and
future generations to determine the value that they place on the threatened
77 See DALY, supra note 43, at 56.
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ecological impacts of global warming, in all of the numerous and disparate
forms that scientists have identified as possibilities. It would require trans-
forming those valuations into a tax that is first imposed on certain primary ac-
tivities such as electricity production and then shifted downstream onto every
human choice or activity that gives rise, directly or indirectly, to the emission
of greenhouse gases. And for what purpose must these calculations and as-
sessments be made? In a sense, to extract a judgment about the fate of the
world from the flip of a light switch. To view every minute behavioral choice
as revealing a vote about vital systemic costs of collective action that may
threaten the ability of future generations even to subsist.
Given the daunting and at least arguably incoherent nature of this task, the
ecological economist instead focuses on the question of scale directly. Why
not determine, from an ecological and a social perspective, how large the hu-
man macroeconomy ought to become and institute direct macrolevel controls to
achieve that scale? Such an approach seems more appropriate than attempting
to divide and assign such macrolevel questions to billions of microlevel decisions
that have little or nothing to do with the larger issue at the moment of choice.
4. Summary.-Standard economic theory and ecological economic
theory both divide the world into separate categories of fixed and manipu-
lable factors. Standard economics treats -nonmaterial factors such as prefer-
ences and income distribution as given. The economist's task then is to
ensure that material factors, such as capital and goods, are most efficiently
employed to suit the given nonmaterial parameters. In practice, the adjust-
ment of material factors generally entails economic growth, often through
increasing exploitation of natural resources. Ecological economists, in con-
trast, take the physical environment as fixed and contemplate mechanisms
for adjusting nonmaterial factors to best suit the given ecological super-
structure. That is, ecological economists study "how the nonphysical vari-
ables of technology, preferences, distribution, and lifestyles can be brought
into feasible and just equilibrium with the complex biophysical system of
which we are a part. '78 Such adjustment entails the enhancement of re-
source productivity and the just distribution of wealth and income, all
within the context of a steady-state, or non-physically expanding, economy.
Admittedly, the hallmark policy instrument reviewed in the preceding
sections-the tradable permit-is not novel. 79 What is new and valuable
78 Id. at 4.
79 It should be noted, however, that the tradable permit appears to have received its earliest expression
in the work of an ecological economist. Although generally traced to Canadian economist J.H. Dales, see
Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 302 (citing J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968)), the trad-
able permit actually seems to have originated in the work of ecological economist Kenneth Boulding,
whose proposal for tradable reproductive rights as a means for achieving population control preceded
Hale's proposal by four years. See DALY, supra note 43, at 56 (describing it as "the first clear exposition of
the logic of the [transferable licenses] scheme, although applied to the least likely area of acceptance politi-
cally" (citing KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE MEANING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1964)).
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from ecological economics, though, is the presence of a preanalytic vision
that gives coherence to the tradable permit analysis. The standard fishery
permit analysis is compelling because so many commentators have recog-
nized the problem of scale inherent in exhaustible resources like fish popu-
lations. Once commentators perceive the problem of scale as universal to
human economic activity, however, a more integrated vision of how such
activity impacts the welfare of humans, other species, and the earth itself
will need to replace conventional economics. This vision will need to be
one that facilitates deliberation about the scale of all types of activity; one
that attempts to integrate not merely efficiency into the discussion, but also
problems of distribution and sustainability; one that refuses to treat vital
scientific, ethical, and political issues as exogenous to its analysis; one that,
in short, provides a sound basis on which to guide policy in a full world.
Ecological economics provides such a vision. The next Part provides an
overview of how an ecological economic analysis of law and public policy
might appear if the vision of ecological economists was adopted by legal
scholars interested in questions of environmental import.
II. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
In recent years, legal economic scholars-Steven Shavell and Louis
Kaplow most notably-have argued that analysis of jurisprudential deci-
sionmaking should focus on efficiency rather than on notions of distributive
equity or fairness.80 That is, common-law judges should construct legal
rules to achieve optimal allocation of resources among competing uses,
without concern for the distributional effects of such rules. The reasoning
behind this approach is relatively straightforward: for every inefficient but
desirably redistributive legal rule, one can imagine an alternate legal rule,
coupled with a redistributive tax scheme that would achieve the same de-
sired wealth transfer without the efficiency loss. For that reason, along with
its comparative administrative advantage at transferring wealth, the tax-and-
transfer system, it is argued, should be the exclusive means for the govern-
ment to address distributional concerns.
While it may be true that "any regime with an inefficient [but redis-
tributive] legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule
and a modified income tax system designed so that every person is made
better off,"'" the modified income tax system necessary to ensure that such
80 See Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PROC.
414 (1981); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter, Kaplow & Shavell, Why the
Legal System]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter, Kap-
low & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare].
81 Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note 80, at 669.
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a Pareto improvement actually eventuates may not be possible within a
given political climate. As a practical matter, therefore, Shavell and Kap-
low's argument may demonstrate only that potential Pareto improvements
may be gained by excluding distributive effects from the selection of legal
rules. Their reasoning does not address whether legal decisionmakers
should continue to ignore distributional effects when it is not confidently
known that the "modified income tax system" will be adopted-that is,
when it is not known that the redistribution necessary to achieve the Pareto
improvement will occur. 82
A similar analysis applies to the goal of sustainable scale. Although it
has not appeared within the legal economic literature, one could make an
argument against the consideration of scale effects of legal rules that tracks
Shavell and Kaplow's contention that the macroeconomic goal of equitable
distribution is best addressed through comprehensive legislative schemes
such as the tax-and-transfer system. The same response, however, would
apply: whether ignorance of scale effects is justified in the face of legisla-
tive recalcitrance is a separate, and more difficult, question. Indeed, with
respect to scale, the situation is more problematic because no mechanism
analogous to the tax-and-transfer system currently exists to regulate the
physical scale of the economy. Achieving a sustainable scale of the human
economy is left as a macroeconomic goal better addressed through unique,
macroeconomic policy instruments; yet no such instruments are in place.
Moreover, one popular response to the distribution question, which
holds that growth in the scale of the economy will raise absolute wealth
levels for all market participants, 3 stands in tension with the goal of main-
taining society's ecological footprint within sustainable parameters. In the
view of ecological economists, the biophysical demands generally associ-
ated with economic growth have pushed the human economy toward unsus-
tainable levels. Thus, once one accepts that the level of human economic
activity is subject to absolute ecological constraints, the macroeconomic
concerns of distribution and scale no longer can be pushed to the side in an
ever-intensifying pursuit of growth.
For at least two reasons, therefore, legal theorists might benefit from in-
corporating the findings of ecological economists into their analysis, not
merely with respect to policy formulation and legislative decisionmaking, but
also with respect to common-law rulemaking. First, because no political
mechanism analogous to the tax-and-transfer system exists to regulate the
scale of the macroeconomy, scholars cannot confidently ignore the scale ef-
82 The authors are forthcoming about this limitation. Id. at 675 ("An argument sometimes offered in
favor of redistribution through legal rules is that the tax system falls short of optimal redistributive taxa-
tion-perhaps because of the balance of political power in the legislature. This argument raises ques-
tions that we do not seek to address about the function of courts in a democracy."); Kaplow & Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 80, at 995 n.66.
83 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1403, 1435-36
(2001).
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fects of alternative legal rules in the way that some scholars have advocated
ignoring distributive effects. Second, because the unrefined economic growth
response to the distribution problem is in tension with the goal of sustainable
scale, justifying the ignorance of both problems eventually will become un-
tenable. In light of this possibility, legal scholars should address both prob-
lems now by allowing ecological economic insights to inform their analyses.
This Part attempts to contribute to that project by reviewing a variety
of specific policy implications that flow from the theoretical framework of
ecological economics. As explained in subpart B, scholars have proposed a
number of regulatory instruments that address the issues of sustainability
and scale in a comprehensive manner analogous to the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem. Before turning to those instruments, subpart A briefly reviews some
ways in which ecological economics might inform judicial as well as legis-
lative decisionmaking.
A. Assessing the Scale Effects of Common Law Rules
Optimal maintenance of scale requires the type of comprehensive re-
medial measures that generally are considered legislative in nature.84 Nev-
ertheless, the common-law rules adopted by judges also can impact the size
and severity of the human presence within the ecosystem. Accordingly, ju-
dicial actions are an important component of the ecological economic
analysis of law. This subpart reviews various ways in which common-law
decisionmaking can be informed by ecological economic theory.
1. Preanalytic Vision and Default Principles in Property Law.-An
oft-discussed pair of cases involving negative easements for light and air in
property law 85 captures the competing preanalytic visions embraced by con-
ventional and ecological economics. In Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v.
Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,86 a Florida appeals court rejected a nuisance
complaint brought by a luxury hotel owner against another hotel, the expan-
sion of which threatened to place the first hotel's pool area in shadow. The
court noted that American jurisprudence does not recognize "a legal right to
the free flow of light and air across the adjoining land of [one's]
neighbor."87 Instead, the background common-law rule, labeled the "uni-
versal rule"88 by the court, is "that adjoining landowners have an equal right
under the law to build to the line of their respective tracts and to such a
height as is desired by them."89
84 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978).
85 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 325-52 (1st
ed. 1993) (reproducing and discussing Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114
So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) and Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982)).
86 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
87 Id. at 359.
88 Id. at 360.
89 Id.
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In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Prah v. Marett90 recog-
nized a common-law nuisance cause of action brought by a homeowner
against his neighbor for obstruction of access to sunlight as a natural source
of energy. Consistent with Fountainebleau, the "defendant assert[ed] that
he has a right to develop his property in compliance with statutes, ordi-
nances and private covenants without regard to the effect of such develop-
ment upon the plaintiffs access to sunlight." 91  The court, however,
departed from the traditional common-law rule, arguing that "the policy of
favoring unhindered private development in an expanding economy is no
longer in harmony with the realities of our society.
92
These two courts premise their decisions upon contrasting visions of
human economic activity. 93 Fountainebleau, by assuming that all structures
other than fences erected purely for spite "serve[] a useful and beneficial
purpose, 94 envisages the empty world of the cowboy economy in which
development of land without regard to external consequences is a logical
and defensible pursuit. Prah, in contrast, views land as limited in supply,
such that one cannot ignore external harms caused by development on the
assumption that abundant alternative resources are available for the ag-
grieved neighbor. In that regard, Prah could be said to represent the
spaceman economy vision at the heart of ecological economics. When
fashioning default rules regarding the use of land, therefore, common-law
judges adopting an ecological economic approach would follow Prah and
hold that, at least under appropriate circumstances, "obstruction of access to
light might be found to constitute a nuisance."95
90 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).
91 Id. at 188.
92 Id. at 190.
93 Admittedly, the cases also can be distinguished on factual grounds. For instance, unlike Foun-
tainbleau, Prah involved both a defendant who had been advised of the plaintiff's need for access to
sunlight prior to purchasing his lot and a plaintiff whose solar use was seemingly entitled to enhanced
judicial protection fresh on the heels of the 1970s energy crisis. Nevertheless, as noted in the text, the
opinions also seem to evince contrasting background assumptions regarding the general availability of
land and assumed benefits of development.
94 114 So. 2d at 359.
95 321 N.W.2d at 191. Of course, in the pure Coasean setting, neither rule will affect the eventual
allocation of rights to use the land. See Coase, supra note 62. In the less pure world of actual bargain-
ing, however, the very selection of a default rule creates an entitlement that may alter people's valuation
of the subject resource. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willing-
ness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 104-05 (1993); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1541,
1551 (1998) ("Even excluding transaction costs, the allocation of a right is 'stickier' than Coase had as-
sumed."). Thus, a common law judge who follows Prah may not only provide judicial recognition of
the ecological economic worldview, but may also alter the resulting allocation of rights among the par-
ties. As Jeffrey Rachlinski and Forest Jourden demonstrate, this will be particularly true when the inter-
est in sunlight access is protected by injunctive relief, as opposed to a mere damages remedy. See id. at
1574-75 (concluding that psychological attachment to legal rights is stronger when rights are protected
by property rules, as opposed to liability rules).
696
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As John Sprankling has argued, however, quite the opposite preana-
lytic vision has guided American common-law property rules over much of
the last two centuries.96 In describing what he terms the "antiwilderness
bias" in American property law, Sprankling notes that a variety of common-
law doctrines reflect the efforts of early American judges to "modifly] Eng-
lish property law to encourage the agrarian development, and thus destruc-
tion, of privately owned American wilderness." 97  These early courts
transformed adverse possession, for instance, from a doctrine designed to
protect the true owner of land against frivolous title claims to one designed
to promote the effective exploitation of land.98 Judicial attention shifted
from ensuring that the adverse possessor's activities signaled adequate no-
tice of a title claim to assessing whether the possessor's activities consti-
tuted a reasonably productive use of the land in question. "By lowering the
legal threshold for adverse possession [in this manner]," Sprankling writes,
"courts tended to transfer title from idle owner E to proven user F, whose
development track record predicted future exploitation."99 In other words,
courts actively promoted the development of land.
A host of other property doctrines reflect this pro-development, "anti-
wilderness" bias,100 all seemingly premised on the assumption that the fabled
abundance of the American frontier is limitless. Yet, as Sprankling writes,
"[p]roperty rules crafted in an age of wilderness abundance are ill-suited to
today's age of wilderness scarcity."'" Rather, contemporary common law
principles should reflect the spaceman economy vision by requiring careful
consideration of the diversity of land uses and their concomitant environ-
mental impacts and importance. Moreover, as ecological economists have
noted, undeveloped land should not be seen as necessarily idle given that the
"wild" state of land can provide a variety of ecological services that are of
benefit to humans and often cannot be replaced cost-effectively by industrial
alternatives. 102 A common-law property system that retains an "antiwilder-
ness" bias may fail to appreciate the water filtration, soil stabilization, and
other vital ecological services provided by undeveloped land.
Similarly, though some commentators have criticized conservation
easements and other ecologically motivated servitudes on land as unduly
restrictive of future generations,103 such legal instruments also may be
96 See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
519 (1996).
97 Id. at521.
98 Id. at 538-40; see also John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique ofAdverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994).
99 Sprankling, supra note 96, at 539.
'00 Id. at 521.
101 Id.
102 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 36-39.
103 See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L.
REV. 739 (2002).
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viewed as a practical response to the troublesome fact that present genera-
tions cannot not bind the land use decisions of future generations. Whether
a parcel is subjected to a conservation restriction or transformed into a park-
ing lot, the parcel in both cases will have been modified in ways that limit
the uses to which future generations can put the land. The legal recognition
of conservation servitudes, which has been accomplished through state stat-
utes, 10 4 simply represents a judgment that certain legal instruments should
be available to allow current owners to accomplish intergenerational trans-
fers of undeveloped, as well as developed, land. Again, such a judgment is
not necessarily contrary to the fundamental principle of property law that
favors "the maximization of the value of land."105 Rather, as ecological
economists have argued, often the most beneficial use of land is conserva-
tion, given that land left to the processes of natural transformation can pro-
vide multiple ecological services to humans. 10  In other words, the
dichotomy between "developed" and "preserved" land is not only unsta-
ble,10 7 it is false. Preserved land can be highly developed, if by "devel-
oped" one means a state beneficial to human well-being.
In short, judicial willingness to consider the lessons of ecological eco-
nomics might lead to a more harmonized vision of property in which wil-
derness is not equated with idleness or preservation with stagnation.
American property law developed in a vastly different era of land use from
today, one in which the frontier wilderness was seen as unimaginably vast.
The famous Lockean proviso that private ownership of resource use is col-
lectively maximizing only so long as "there is enough, and as good left in
common for others"'10 8 arguably has become an issue of actual, rather than
merely philosophical, concern. Contemporary property law therefore
should be premised on a vision of finitude, not plenitude.
2. Fugitive Property and the Optimal Exploitation of Resources.-
The standard law and economics account of natural gas, wild animals, and
other resources that do not conform to fixed, definable boundaries serves as
another example of how ecological economic insights might inform com-
mon-law decisionmaking. As Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen explain,
such "fugitive property" presents an efficiency tradeoff between overutiliza-
tion costs and administrative costs.'09 The "rule of first possession," in
104 See id. at 749-50.
i05 Id. at 771.
106 It is important to note that such "undeveloped" land does not imply a static state of nature. See
DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(1990) (critiquing a view of nature in which ecosystems exist in static equipoise); A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1121 (1994) (assessing the implications of new, dynamic ecological paradigms for law and en-
vironmental management).
107 See Mahoney, supra note 103, at 763-67.
108 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 5, § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963).
109 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-15 (2d ed. 1997).
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which property rights are given to the first user who reduces the resource to
actual possession, provides legal certainty and administrative ease, but si-
multaneously encourages waste in the form of rapid exploitation of natural
resources. An alternative rule, such as a "rule of tied ownership," in which
resources belong to the owner of real property wherein the resources are
found, helps to prevent the "race to exploit" caused by a rule of first posses-
sion. At the same time, however, the rule increases administrative costs by
hinging ownership on facts that are difficult and expensive to discern and
that may be subject to rapid change. Without knowing more about the rela-
tive distortions caused by the competing rules, it is impossible to say which
rule best promotes economic efficiency. I10
Ecological economic analysis of law would enrich this textbook law
and economics account by demonstrating that only the rule of first posses-
sion creates undesirable scale effects, in addition to indeterminate efficiency
effects. According to Cooter and Ulen, the rule of first possession promotes
resource exploitation at faster than optimal rates because it grants entitle-
ment holders a right not only to the productive value of the resource, but
also to the premiums commanded by its scarcity value in the future."'
Thus, in an effort to capture future scarcity rents by claiming title to re-
sources currently, firms engage in inefficient (essentially, premature) ex-
ploitation under the rule of first possession." 2 In addition, however, they
also confound efforts to maintain an optimal scale of resource use. From a
social perspective, the decision to exploit a resource rests not only on
whether the exploiting firm could have put its investment to some more
beneficial current use, but also on whether the resource ought, as a matter of
ethics and distributive justice, to remain available for exploitation by future
generations." 3 In other words, current exploitation may be both intragen-
erationally inefficient and intergenerationally unjust. The "race to exploit"
caused by the rule of first possession undermines both social goals.
In short, although an efficiency analysis alone is indeterminate, the ad-
ditional consideration of scale effects counsels against a rule of first posses-
sion in the context of fugitive property. The efficiency loss created by the
higher administrative costs of tied ownership is not purely fungible with the
negative effects of the rule of first possession, which include not just cur-
10 Id. at 114.
II Id. at 113.
112 Of course, in some circumstances, possession need not entail exploitation. For instance, one
could pump oil from the ground in order to claim title under the rule of first possession, but not neces-
sanly utilize the resource until a later date. In other settings, however, possession and exploitation tend
to go hand in hand. With respect to the traditional "rule of prior appropriation" for water use, for in-
stance, possession has been defined as exploitation. See Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo:
Protecting Established Waters Uses in the Pacific Northwest Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation,
28 ENVTL. L. 881, 886 (1998) ("The traditional steps needed to establish a water right are intent, diver-
sion of water from its natural source, and application of water to a beneficial use.").
113 See WEISS, supra note 67, at 1-15.
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rent allocative inefficiency but also distortions in the ethical distribution of
scarce resources across time. Thus, whenever possession of a resource is
tantamount to current exploitation of it, 14 the rule of first possession will
complicate attempts to limit the scale of resource use.
To be sure, an alternative such as the rule of tied ownership does not by
itself guarantee that resources will be exploited in the manner deemed most
appropriate vis-A-vis future generations. It does, however, eliminate the ur-
gency to exploit resources now simply in order to establish one's claim of ti-
tle. A more direct means of restricting premature consumption of a resource
would require rethinking the very notion of common law property rights. For
instance, an ecological economic approach to fugitive resources might coun-
sel courts to recognize property rights only to the extent of a socially ap-
proved level of annual extraction of a resource, rather than the total stock of
the resource."'5 This approach would go beyond existing doctrines that re-
strict "waste" of a resource by directly limiting the level of permissible re-
source use, irrespective of whether it is to be put to productive use.
3. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Nature's Cathedral.-As a
final example of how ecological economics might inform common-law de-
cisionmaking, consider the much-analyzed question of whether a plaintiffs
entitlement to be free from nuisance activities by neighboring landowners
should be protected by injunctive or monetary relief." 6 The canonical law
and economics view, first articulated by Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed,117 holds that damages remedies are preferable in situations where
parties are unlikely to bargain, due to the presence of high transaction costs.
For instance, when factory pollutants harm neighboring homeowners, prob-
lems of strategic behavior may prevent the parties from allocating legal en-
titlements through bargaining."18 In such a situation, judges should protect
the homeowners' right to be free of harmful pollution by awarding mone-
tary relief, despite the traditional availability of injunctions for ongoing nui-
sances. In this manner, the factory can decide for itself whether to
"purchase" the homeowners' entitlement by paying an ex post damages
award, effectively circumventing hold-out problems and other impediments
to bargaining posed by the homeowner class.
Cooter and Ulen examine the related question of whether damages
should be awarded on a temporary or permanent basis. 19 These theorists
114 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 113.
115 Cf infra text accompanying notes 226-36 (describing a legislative proposal along such lines). I
am indebted to Buzz Thompson for suggesting this point.
116 See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 95, at 1546-50 (reviewing legal economic literature with
regard to this issue).
117 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
18 Id. at 1106-07.
119 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 141-42.
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note that a temporary damages award, compensating plaintiffs for past harm
but requiring them to return to court to recover for harm caused in the fu-
ture, is costly to administer but provides adequate incentives for defendants
to adopt cost-efficient technological improvements to avoid future liabil-
ity.'20 Conversely, a permanent damages award, compensating plaintiffs for
all past and future expected harm, is cheaper to administer but entails an ef-
ficiency loss because "permanent damages create no incentive for injurers
to adopt technical improvements that reduce external costs below the level
stipulated in the judgment."''11
Again, however, an ecological economic analysis of the alternative
rules helps to resolve the apparently indeterminate tradeoff between admin-
istrative and allocative efficiency. Notably, the permanent damages ap-
proach purports to compensate landowners for the value of both present and
future harm to their land. Assuming that a satisfactory value can be placed
on such harm, the defendant then can decide whether its environmentally
destructive activities are more valuable than the external costs imposed on
present and future neighbors. As Cooter and Ulen note, however, such a
judgment requires the selection of a discount rate to reduce future damage
to a present value.'22 As discussed above,' 23 one cannot rely on a discount
rate to determine logically the distribution of entitlements across genera-
tions. Specifically, one cannot reduce a future generation's environmental
harm to a present value without first deciding whether to permit the future
environmental harm to occur. The temporary damages approach avoids
such conceptual problems by allowing for continual reassessment of the
reasonableness of the defendant's activity. The temporary approach, there-
fore, is preferable to the permanent approach because it does not require
courts to resolve in a final manner questions of intergenerational rights to
environmental goods and services.
More fundamentally, an ecological economic perspective calls into
question the insight of Calabresi and Melamed that courts should prefer
damages remedies in cases of high transaction costs. From an efficiency
perspective, such liability rules are preferable to property rules because they
allow the circumvention of collective action problems, strategic behavior,
and other well-known barriers to Coasean trading.124 The scale effects of
liability rules, however, may not be as desirable as their efficiency effects.
As just noted, a permanent damages rule confounds attempts to restrict pol-
luting activities to environmentally sustainable parameters by attempting to
subsume such judgments within the discount rate. Moreover, even a tempo-
120 Id. at 141.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
124 See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 451 (1995).
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rary damages liability rule depends critically on the availability of compre-
hensive scientific information regarding environmental harm and a satisfac-
tory means of reducing that harm to a monetary judgment. 2 In other
words, courts must have substantial knowledge in order to set an appropri-
ate level of damages.
In light of such informational demands, an argument in favor of prop-
erty rules might be that, where one party's activities threaten a potentially
irreplaceable natural resource,'2 6 property rule protection affords the owner
of that resource an ability to contest both the other party's and the court's
valuation. In a sense, this approach merely transfers the informational de-
mands from the polluter or the court to the resource owner. Indeed, eco-
logical economists would contend that no individual polluter or resource
owner possesses the scientific information and ethical authority necessary
to determine whether the resource in question should be converted to pre-
sent use. Rather, such judgments generally should be made as part of a
comprehensive public scheme of the sort to be described in subpart B.
Nevertheless, in the context of prescribing background rules regarding
environmentally harmful nuisances, an ecologically inclined court might pre-
fer to award property-rule protection to the aggrieved neighbors precisely be-
cause such parties would then be in a position to refuse offers made by the
polluting factory that did not equal or exceed their willingness-to-accept
valuation of the environmental harm (which is likely to be higher than either
their willingness-to-pay valuation or some ex post objective calculation). 12 7
A default rule of property rule protection, in other words, provides a deliber-
ately precautionary stance with respect to the destruction or impairment of
potentially irreplaceable environmental goods and services. 128
4. Summary.-As detailed in the next subpart, scholars have given
far more systematic thought to the question of how ecological economic
theory might shape legislative policymaking. Nevertheless, based on the
preceding, largely speculative examples, ecological economics also appears
to offer promising theoretical aid in the construction of common-law rules.
Just as efficiency has become a meta-principle guiding the selection of legal
125 The argument in this section builds on the notion of "assessment costs" articulated by James
Krier and Stewart Schwab in their enlightening extension of the Calabresi and Melamad framework.
See id. at 453 ("Just as obstacles to bargaining (transaction costs) might impede efficient exchanges by
the parties in property rule cases, so problems in obtaining and processing information (assessment
costs) might impede efficient damage calculations by the judge in liability rule cases.").
126 To be sure, the Boomer case itself involved "dirt, smoke and vibration emanating from [a ce-
ment) plant" that seemingly would not cause irreversible harm to neighboring resources. Boomer v. Atl.
Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1970). Application of the Boomer reasoning, however, need not be lim-
ited to such temporary, reversible environmental harms.
127 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 124, at 457-58.
128 Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 113 n.36 (1999) (arguing for a presumption in favor
of injunctive relief in Boomer settings as part of an "environmental baseline" for common law
decisionmaking).
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rules in all manners of common-law contexts, the ecological economic con-
cept of scale also could become a dominant consideration in legal deci-
sionmaking. Indeed, because it relates to the ultimate capacity for human
economic activity to sustain itself, scale arguably may be of even more im-
portance than efficiency.
B. The Public Policy Implications of Ecological Economics
Many existing environmental statutes could be said to incorporate the
type of conservationist approach advocated by ecological economists. For
instance, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill, the Endan-
gered Species Act'29 represents "a plain intent of Congress ... to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.' 130  Simi-
larly, the Ninth Circuit at one time interpreted the Delaney Clause' 3' to re-
quire the Environmental Protection Agency "to prohibit all [food] additives
that are carcinogens, regardless of the degree of risk involved.' 132  Other
examples include the Clean Air Act, which adopted national ambient air qual-
ity standards without regard to cost, 33 and the 1973 Clean Water Act, which
announced a goal of eliminating all water pollution by 1985.134 Such statutes,
and their judicial interpretations, may be seen as reflecting a concern that eco-
logical values do not receive due consideration under a strict cost-benefit
analysis. To combat such potential shortchanging, legislators seek to remove
certain environmental goods from utilitarian balancing altogether.
Such an approach, however, is both more extreme and less comprehen-
sive than the approach desired by ecological economists. By purporting to
require conservation of water resources "whatever the cost" or eliminate
carcinogens "regardless of the degree of risk involved," these pieces of leg-
islation appear to banish instrumental and scientific judgment from the de-
cisionmaking process altogether, to the dismay of ecological as well as
conventional economists. Moreover, even in combination, the statutes men-
129 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
130 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,184 (1978).
131 The Delaney Clause provides that "no [food] additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the
evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal." 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)
(2000). Because a literal reading of the provision would have required the Environmental Protection
Agency to ban a number of commonly used agricultural chemicals, the Agency for years sought to avoid
invoking the "Delaney Clause" through a variety of means. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and En-
vironmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REv. 553, 633 n.548 (2001). In 1996,
Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act, which effectively reduced the scope of the "Delaney
Clause" by redefining the term "food additive" so that it does not include chemical pesticide residues
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(1994 & Supp. 111996).
132 See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir. 1992).
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001).
134 See 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) (2000) ("[l]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.").
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tioned above fail to provide anything approaching the comprehensive moni-
toring and maintenance of scale that ecological economists believe is neces-
sary to obtain optimal, long-run development. In their view, the "single-
media, single-species, single-substance and single life cycle stages ap-
proaches,"' 35 typified by statutes like the Endangered Species Act, ultimately
must yield to a more holistic set of policy tools if society's objective is to
achieve the normative goal of sustainability or otherwise monitor its scale.
This subpart attempts to provide an overview of such policy tools. It
does so by organizing ecological economic reform proposals under head-
ings corresponding to significant determinants of society's ecological im-
pact. As noted above, Daly has described population and per capita
resource use as two key determinants of the level of throughput in the econ-
omy. 136 A widely used variation on Daly's description disaggregates re-
source use into separate factors of per capita consumption levels and per
unit of consumption environmental impact levels. Thus, the environmental
impact of a society (1) is equal to the product of its population (P), its afflu-
ence or per capita level of consumption (A), and its technology or environ-
mental impact per unit of consumption (7): I = P x A x T.137  This
formulation makes explicit the role of technology in achieving sustainabil-
ity: the greater efficiency with which society uses its natural resources, the
greater level of affluence or population size it may reach while keeping en-
vironmental impact constant. The task of governmental decisionmakers,
under an ecological economic approach, is to design policy tools in such a
way that the determinants of scale exert a combined impact that suits soci-
ety's collective judgment regarding the desirable level of its economic ac-
tivity (e.g., within the carrying capacity of the environment).
1. Technology.-The ecological economic approach to improving
technological efficiency is not controversial. It follows the long-accepted in-
sight of Pigou that an ideal market must force the internalization of costs
causally related to an economic activity. So long as a firm does not bear re-
sponsibility for these costs, and so long as victims face impediments to bar-
gaining with the firm, 3' the firm lacks strong incentives to avoid or minimize
the costs. Pigou recognized that by levying a tax on the firm equal in amount
to the "externality," governments can force the firm to behave in the manner
that benefits society most-namely, by developing alternate production
methods that avoid or reduce the externality or by passing on the cost of the
externality to consumers so that they may better decide whether the consump-
tion item is desirable in light of its full social price.
135 Charles W. Powers & Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology: Overcoming Policy Fragmenta-
tion, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 19, 23 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
136 See supra text accompanying note 43.
137 See Kenneth N. Townsend, Steady-State Economies and the Command Economy, in VALUING
THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS, supra note 28, at 275, 290-91.
138 See supra text accompanying note 62.
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As noted above, 13 9 ecological economists believe that such Pigouvian
taxes are insufficient by themselves to regulate society's environmental im-
pact, primarily because the informational demands of such taxes outstrip
scientific knowledge of ecosystem dynamics and ethical agreement on
proper valuation methods for environmental goods and services. Neverthe-
less, these theorists still view environmental taxes as a welcome improve-
ment over existing policies, which sometimes fail even to attempt
regulation of environmental externalities. This subpart, therefore, reviews a
series of concrete proposals to improve technological efficiency by forcing
private cost functions to better correspond to social cost functions, recog-
nizing that such policies can fulfill only a limited role within a comprehen-
sive approach to regulating scale.
a. Subsidy Elimination.-The clearest case for reform can be
made with respect to government subsidization of industries that harm the
environment. 140 Here, the government not only fails to tax industries for the
costs of their external effects, but actually lowers internal industry cost
functions by providing lucrative subsidies. As a result, the privileged in-
dustry conducts its business with a balance sheet tilted in favor of exploita-
tive activities. Such government distortion of the market can produce
extreme results, as in the case of the fishing industry:
The collapse of many of the world's fisheries would not have been possible
without massive governmental subsidization of the fishing industry. In 1995,
the fishing industry spent $124 billion to catch $70 billion worth of fish. Gov-
ernments made up virtually all of the difference through direct subsidization of
gear and infrastructure, low-interest loans, price supports, fuel-tax exemptions,
and scores of other mechanisms designed to increase the income from catching
fish.1
4 1
David Roodman has provided a useful taxonomy of the many ways in
which the public subsidizes activity that harms the environment. 42 The
most obvious come in the guise of cash handouts, tax breaks, below-market
interest or exchange rates, and other manipulations designed to provide
capital to an industry that the unfettered market might be unwilling to sup-
139 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73. It also should be mentioned that Pigou himself felt
that such regulatory taxes would be nearly impossible to operationalize: "[T]he practical difficulty of
determining the right rates of bounty and of duty would be extraordinarily great. The data necessary for
scientific decision are almost whole lacking." A.C. PIGOU, SOCIALISM VS. CAPITALISM 42-43 (1947).
140 See Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31, 55-56 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000).
141 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Bio-
diversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1166 (1999). Given that open-seas fisheries are a prototypical exam-
ple of the commons problem, see supra note 37, it is likely that certain fisheries would have collapsed
even without "massive governmental subsidization." Nevertheless, subsidization surely exacerbates the
problem.
142 See DAVID MALIN ROODMAN, THE NATURAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: HARNESSING THE MARKET
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 31-44 (1998).
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port. The government's subsidization of the fishing industry typifies this
approach. Other examples include agricultural price support payments,
which amounted to $4.5 billion in the United States in 1996,' 41 and billions
of dollars worth of direct subsidies to the coal industry in nations such as
Germany, Japan, and Spain. 144 Perhaps the most striking of this type of
subsidy are the sizeable benefits that U.S. mining, oil, and gas companies
receive through a series of congressionally granted tax dispensations.145 In-
deed, Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the oil and
gas industries in the United States are effectively exempt from income tax
liability. 146
Government giveaways and below-cost sales of publicly owned re-
sources, such as minerals, precious metals, and timber comprise a second
group of subsidies. In the United States, for example, the mining industry
still operates under the General Mining Law of 1872, which allows private
companies the right to mine on public land for between $2.50 and $5.00 per
acre. 147 As an example of how beneficial this statute can be to private enti-
ties, consider Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., which in 1994 obtained rights
to an estimated $10 billion in resources on public land for a fee of$10,000.148 Similarly, the logging industry benefits from government
spending on access roads and other management services that cost more
than the value of U.S. Forest Service timber sales.149 In Alaska's Tongass
National Forest, for instance, the government spent $389 million between
1982 and 1988 on roads and other assistance to private logging operations,
yet received only $32 million in return.150
Roodman's final group of subsidies consists of government charges for
the use of roads, sewers, irrigation systems, and other elements of infra-
structure for less than their full cost of creation and operation. For instance,
the agricultural sector obtains irrigation services from water reclamation
projects through fifty-year, no-interest loans and other cost-reducing
mechanisms."1 As a result, from 1902 to 1986, the government spent be-
143 Id. at 67.
144 Id. at 72-73.
145 See Mona L. Hymel, The Population Crisis: The Stork, the Plow, and the IRS, 77 N.C. L. REv.
13, 117-23 (1998).
146 See id. at 122; see also Stavins, supra note 140, at 56 (noting that fossil fuel energy subsidies to-
tal some $17 billion annually).
147 See General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-45 (2000); Sam Kelan, An 1872 Mining Law
for the New Millenium, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 343, 348 (2000); GEORGE COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 95-96 (1993).
14s See Kelan, supra note 147, at 356-57.
149 See Thompson, Jr., supra note 141, at 1168 (noting that "[i]n the early 1990s, over half of the
National Forests lost money on timber sales; annual forestry losses were approximately $300-$400 mil-
lion per year").
150 See ROODMAN, supra note 142, at 51.
151 Thompson, Jr., supra note 141, at 1167.
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tween $47 billion and $99 billion (in 1997 dollars) more than it earned on
public irrigation projects.1 12 Likewise, the U.S. government loses an esti-
mated $4.4 billion annually by selling power below cost from its dams and
nuclear reactors.153 Meanwhile, the government spends approximately $1
billion a year on subsidized loans to extend power lines throughout rural re-
gions, placing alternative energy sources such as solar panels and natural
gas turbines at a competitive disadvantage in what might otherwise be fa-
vorable markets. 1 5
4
From an economic perspective, the danger of such subsidization is
twofold. First, it encourages private investment in resource exploitation
that might otherwise be uneconomic. Second, it provides inaccurate price
information to consumers by burying much of the cost of resource-
intensive products within the general tax burden.5 Together, these ef-
fects promote arguably unsustainable levels of production and consump-
tion throughout the economy. The ecological economic strategy to
counter such an effect is both simple and obvious: eliminate the subsi-
dies. The more challenging task, however, is to implement such a strategy
in light of the impressive lobbying power of vested subsidy beneficiar-
ies. 1 56 One useful regulatory approach might be to withdraw subsidies in
a gradual fashion, allowing for an adjustment period for the once-favored
industry. Broader structural changes, such as campaign finance reform or
amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act, also have been consid-
ered as ways to overcome political and legal obstacles to reform govern-
mental resource disposition.157
Commentators justifiably bemoan the political difficulty of removing
extensive and lucrative natural resource subsidies. Nevertheless, there is
also danger in adopting a worldview in which all firms are seen as purely
self-interested, all bureaucrats captured, and all politicians beholden. As
David Spence has noted, the public choice model that gives rise to such
cynicism lacks overwhelming empirical support."5 8 Firm behavior, it turns
out, can be explained by a variety of factors other than pure rational maxi-
152 ROODMAN, supra note 142, at 82.
153 Id. at 81.
154 Id. at 82.
155 If demand for the product of a subsidized industry is relatively inelastic, consumers might pur-
chase approximately the same amount of the product even when the subsidy is eliminated. In this man-
ner, it might be a form of double-counting to discuss uneconomic investment and inaccurate price
information as separate consequences of subsidization. However, even if subsidies do not increase ag-
gregate demand, they still make benefited industries artificially profitable and forfeit a valuable potential
source of government tax revenue.
156 See Thompson, Jr.,supra note 141, at 1166, 1169.
157 See Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets:
Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
158 See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Ac-
tor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 961-65 (2001).
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mization, while much of the history of environmental legislation and regu-
lation belies the simplistic industry capture theory at the heart of environ-
mentalist critiques of the political system.'i 9 In Spence's view, abandoning
hard-nosed pessimism about human nature may be the first step toward a
broader, more unified process of environmental decisionmaking: "Just as
incremental disillusionment with the rational polluter model grows one per-
son at a time, so too may incremental exposure to the benefits of coopera-
tion and collaboration produce a growing pro-reform constituency."' 60 One
day, perhaps, even the 1872 mining law will be amended.
b. Ecological Tax Reform.-While subsidy elimination aims to
correct government intervention favoring environmentally harmful activi-
ties, a second policy tool, ecological tax reform, 16' aims to correct govern-
ment failure to intervene when activities externalize costs onto society and
the environment. In both cases, the market cannot perform its allocative
function efficiently because prices do not reflect the full social costs associ-
ated with production of a commodity or product. Ecological economists
dispute the ability of market-corrective taxes alone to ensure environmental
sustainability,162 yet they support such measures as part of a suite of policy
tools designed to better manage the scale of the human economy. Indeed,
in recent years, a consensus has emerged among ecological economists re-
garding the general features that such an ecological tax scheme should dis-
play. 163
First, taxes should be levied upon various types of pollution, including
"particulates, carbon dioxide, ozone precursors, and other noxious sub-
stances. ' 'lM In the ideal Pigouvian sense, the tax should be set equal to the
marginal environmental cost of production: the cost of common resources
used in production in a way that causes uncompensated detriment to others.' 61
However, such an exercise presumes an unrealistic degree of scientific
159 Id. at 960-77.
160 Id. at 997; see also David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of
Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145 (1995).
161 See Steve Bemow et al., Ecological Tax Reform, BIOSCIENCE, Mar. 1, 1998, at 193.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
163 Because the concept of using government taxing authority to achieve environmental policy goals
has been widely analyzed in the legal academic literature, this section will only briefly summarize the
viewpoint of ecological economists on the issue. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Envi-
ronmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?,
73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 221 (1998); Joe Loper, Evaluating Existing State and Local Tax Codes From an
"Environmental Tax" Perspective: The Case of Energy-Related Taxes, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 61
(1994); Adam Chase, The Efficiency Benefits of "Green Taxes ": A Tribute to Senator John Heinz, 11
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1992); Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of
the Carbon-Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 221 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Constitutionality of State Environmental Taxes, 58 TUL. L. REv. 169 (1983).
164 Bemow et al., supra note 161, at 194.
165 See Richard A. Westin, Understanding Environmental Taxes, 46 TAX LAW. 327, 331-32 (1993).
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knowledge and popular agreement on environmental valuations. 166  As a
practical matter, therefore, the tax must be set according to some combina-
tion of scientific, economic, and political judgments. Despite this inevitable
imprecision, ecological taxes arguably stand to achieve pollution reductions
more cost-effectively than traditional environmental regulations due to their
ability to encourage decentralized decisionmaking and innovation. Eco-
logical taxes allow greater private flexibility in the determination of meth-
ods to achieve pollution reductions, a result almost uniformly lauded by
economists. 67
Second, the revenues generated by ecological taxes should be re-
bated to taxpayers through corresponding reductions in income and pay-
roll taxes.'68 Because pollution taxes would apply heavily to energy
sector firms, and because low-income individuals tend to spend a dis-
proportionately high portion of their income on energy, 169 ecological tax
reforms could potentially have a regressive effect on low-income tax-
payers. This result can be avoided by pairing pollution taxes with reduc-
tions in income and payroll taxes,1 70  a strategy that would
simultaneously help ensure the politically and economically desirable
tax feature of "revenue neutrality."' 7'1
Third, the taxes should be phased in "gradually and predictably over a
number of years to help ensure an orderly, low-cost transition."' 72 The abil-
ity of firms to anticipate future tax liabilities is crucial for maintaining mac-
roeconomic stability, as well as for encouraging appropriate investment in
resource-saving technologies. The gradual introduction of the taxes could
coincide, roughly, with normal capital replacement cycles, thereby reducing
the transitional cost of production changes. The government, with its inter-
est in "maintain[ing] a reasonably stable and predictable stream of revenue
from the new taxes,' 73 also would benefit from a planned phase-in ap-
proach. A gradual introduction of ecological tax reform would allow the
166 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
167 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 331-14 (1998) (noting "econo-
mists' consistent endorsement" of market based over command and control regulations). But see Daniel
H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient?, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 887 (argu-
ing that command and control regulations may promote greater efficiency under certain plausible as-
sumptions regarding informational uncertainty and administrative costs).
168 See Bemow et al., supra note 161, at 194.
169 Id. at 195.
170 Id. In a related proposal, the authors suggest that "a small fraction of the tax revenue [should be
used] to provide transitional assistance for communities, workers, and pollution-intensive industries that
are strongly affected by the tax." Id.
i71 A tax proposal is revenue neutral when it does not alter the aggregate amount of tax 'revenues
collected and therefore also does not alter the macroeconomic position established by government fiscal
policies.
172 Bemow et al., supra note 161, at 195.
173 Id.
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possibility for scheduled rate increases to maintain government revenues
relatively constant despite a likely decline of polluting activities under the
new incentive scheme. 17
4
Finally, some steps could be taken to lessen the handicap that indus-
tries most affected by market-corrective taxes may face in international
competition. If competing industries in other nations do not face equivalent
ecological taxes, unrestricted import of goods from those nations would
negatively impact domestic industry and might ultimately undermine the ef-
ficacy of ecological tax reforms by spurring capital flight to less-regulated
jurisdictions.17 1 "To address this effect," Steve Bernow and colleagues
write, "a compensatory import tariff could be levied on goods manufactured
in countries with less stringent environmental policies."'1 76 Such a measure
would ensure that, at least in the domestic market, firms paying a pollution
tax are not competitively disadvantaged by imports from "countries with
less stringent environmental policies.' ' 77
The benefits of instituting ecological tax reforms may go beyond sim-
ply reducing the incidence of pollution. Other things being equal, any tax
whether levied on labor, capital transfers, wealth inheritance, con-
sumption, pollution, or resource exploitation tends to discourage perform-
ance of the taxed activity. 178 Given this simple economic fact, ecological
economists argue that taxes should be shifted away from socially desir-
able activities, such as employment, and onto socially harmful activities,
such as pollution. As theorists and politicians have long recognized, 79
taxes need not serve only the purpose of generating public revenue. In-
stead, taxes can increase resource efficiency and decrease pollution by
correcting for externalities, while simultaneously improving employment
prospects by lessening disincentives to buy and sell labor created by the
income tax.'8 0 As the ecological economists point out, "[s]uch 'ecologi-
cal' tax reform has the potential to ease both the burden of taxation on
parts of the economy and the burden of the economy on the environ-
174 Id.
175 Id. It should be noted that the present empirical significance of such standards-lowering compe-
tition is unclear. See Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 113,
123-24 (2001).
176 Bemow et al., supra note 161, at 195.
177 Id. A difficulty posed by such an import tariff, however, is that it would be subject to challenge
as an impermissible restraint on trade. See infra text accompanying notes 196-219.
178 Specifically, the tax increases the cost of conducting the activity, making it less attractive rela-
tive to other untaxed activities. Cf Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Le-
gal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1655 (1998) (noting that "[h]igher taxes on the wealthy will tend to
discourage people from earning high incomes").
179 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 387 (1998) ("We are familiar
with two kinds of taxes: those that raise revenue and those that aim to induce behavior of one kind or
another.").
180 See Bemow et al., supra note 161, at 194.
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ment."'81  Broader public recognition of this possibility over time may
help to enhance the political feasibility of ecological economic tax reform.
c. Consumer Product Market Reform.-As with prices for basic
material resources, environmental advocates have argued that retail prices
for finished consumer goods fail to capture their full costs of production,
transportation, and disposal, thereby permitting consumption to rise above
socially optimal levels. In recent years this thesis has achieved interna-
tional political salience. At the 1992 Earth Summit, 178 nations endorsed
the view that contemporary consumer product markets are in need of seri-
ous reform, especially in industrialized nations such as the United States:
"The major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environmental
degradation is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production,
particularly in the industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave con-
cern, aggravating poverty and imbalances.""18
Despite this international recognition, growth in consumption shows
little sign of abatement. Population levels and gross world product per per-
son have more than doubled since 1950.183 This growth has been accompa-
nied by an expansion in the capture and use of raw natural resources. For
example, production levels of coal, oil, natural gas, 84 and timber 5' grew by
at least a factor of two since 1950. During the same five decades, per capita
paper consumption expanded from twenty-five kilograms per person to
181 Id. at 193. The existence of this employment stimulating effect, known as the "double-dividend"
in the literature, is subject to some debate. Don Fullerton and Gilbert Metcalf argue that the wage gain
only occurs when existing command and control regulations already restrict pollution at or near the so-
cially optimal level, such that the first dividend (improvement in environmental quality) is not attained
through ecological tax reform. See Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 163, at 227-29. When command
and control regulations are set at socially optimal levels of pollution, consumer product prices already
reflect internalized pollution costs, such that a shift to environmental tax regulation would not raise pro-
duction costs or otherwise reduce consumer purchasing power. By contrast, Fullerton and Metcalf argue
that when environmental taxes are instituted in a currently under-regulated area of pollution (such that the
first dividend can be attained), consumer product prices ultimately will rise to offset the wage gain caused
by the tax shift. Id. Because of this price rise, the real net wage of employees may remain constant despite
the reduction in income and payroll taxes (such that the second dividend cannot be attained).
This analysis, however, appears to treat the demand for labor as constant regardless of whether envi-
ronmental taxes are instituted; that is, it appears to assume that reducing the cost of labor relative to
capital by shifting the tax burden will not increase the demand for labor. To the extent that labor and
capital are substitutes, a tax shift may stimulate employment, ultimately raising the real net wage despite
the price-rise effect noted by Fullerton and Metcalf. That is, while the wage gain caused by cutting
taxes may be offset by higher prices, the wage gain caused by increased demand for labor may not
182 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development vol. 1, at 37, 38,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151.26 (1992). The phrase "unsustainable pattern of consumption" fails to capture
fully the ecological consequences of current consumer product markets. As explained above, in addition
to population levels, environmental degradation is a consequence of both a society's pattern of con-
sumption (technology) and its level of consumption (affluence).
183 See LESTER R. BROWN et al., VITAL SIGNS: 1999, at 64-65, 98-99 (1999).
184 See id. at 48-49.
185 See id. at 76-77.
HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 711 2002-2003
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
fifty-one.'8 6 The transportation industry experienced similar growth. In
1998, automotive manufacturers produced thirty-eight million automobiles,
raising the global fleet to 508 million, up from only fifty-three million in
1950.11 Over the last fifty years, the number of people per automobile
dropped by almost eighty percent.18 Air travel, the most polluting form of
transportation per kilometer traveled, grew almost one hundred-fold over
the same period and now accounts for five percent of annual world oil con-
sumption. 89 Similar expansion occurred in per capita copper, steel, meat,
cement, plastic, and aluminum consumption. 90 In the aggregate, global
consumption achieved a level that is almost historically inconceivable:
"Measured in constant dollars, the world's people have consumed as many
goods and services since 1950 as all previous generations put together."191
Many commentators agree, therefore, that legal rules should ensure
that consumer product prices reflect total product costs, thereby allowing
consumers to appreciate the full impact of their market choices. 92 The fact
that total cost entails the internalization of a number of distinct types of
product externalities may require an array of diverse legal instruments. For
instance, a products liability regime of enterprise liability would go a long
way toward enhancing the physical safety of consumer products by inter-
nalizing the costs of product-caused personal injuries. 93 Similarly, the en-
vironmental taxes described in the previous subpart would accomplish the
internalization of a great deal of pollutant externalities associated with re-
source-intensive products. James Salzman analyzes a third type of policy
instrument, "extended producer responsibility," that would require manu-
facturers to retake possession of consumer goods upon the expiration of
their useful lives. 94 Such regulations would complement these other tools
by encouraging manufacturers to design and market products that are not
only less dangerous and less resource-intensive, but also less generative of
product packaging and other forms of incidental waste.
A consumer products-regulatory scheme incorporating these and other
cost-internalizing instruments might greatly enhance the efficiency of prod-
uct markets by providing incentives for market actors to reduce costs that
previously they had ignored. When environmental and personal injury
costs are forced onto the balance sheets of consumer product manufacturers,
186 Id. at 78-79.
187 Id. at 82-83.
188 Id.
19 Id. at 86-87.
190 ALAN THEN DURNING, How MUCH Is ENOUGH? 29 (1992).
191 Id. at 38.
192 See, e.g., James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1257
(1997); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1553-65 (1999).
193 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 192, at 1553-71.
194 See Salzman, supra note 192, at 1270-77.
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those firms would undergo a dynamic change in product design and market-
ing strategy toward more sustainable practices.195 Likewise, consumers
would be better informed of the real consequences of their consumption
choices, resulting in a demand shift toward those products that are least
costly in the full meaning of the term. In the aggregate, manufacturer and
consumer incentives would combine to greatly increase the efficiency with
which society derives utility from its use of resources.
d. International Trade Regulation.-During the second half of
the twentieth century, a massive expansion in international trade and global
economic activity occurred. In constant dollars, gross world product ex-
panded six-fold, from $6.4 trillion in 1950 to $39.3 trillion in 1998.196 Over
the same period, world trade exports as a share of gross world product more
than doubled to fourteen percent. 197 The number of corporations operating
in more than one country rose from 7,000 in 1970 to 53,607 in 1998, with
those corporations now controlling at least 448,917 foreign subsidiaries.
19 8
Concurrently, the indebtedness of developing nations rose from $277 bil-
lion in 1971 to $2.2 trillion in 1997.199
A crucial legal catalyst to the development of this global economy has
been the operation of trade agreements among nations, most notably the
Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor institu-
tion, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 00 Designed to liberalize trade
by prohibiting discriminatory government action against foreign producers,
the agreements typically prohibit quantitative trade restrictions such as im-
port quotas, limit the use of tariffs, and subject remaining nontariff trade re-
strictions to certain rules of international law. Under GATT, for instance,
member nations cannot treat products originating in, or destined for, foreign
members differently from either similar domestic products or similar products
from different foreign GATT members.2 10 These superimposed principles of
international economic dealing apply to all domestic regulation, regardless of
whether the regulation is directly concerned with international trade.
202
195 Even with the playing field tilted by externalities, several contemporary business finns are discovenng
that ecologically sustainable practices can be quite profitable. See Amory B. Lovins et al., A Road Map for
Natural Capitalism, HARV. BuS. REV., May-June 1999, at 145 (reviewing several illustrative firms). In a mar-
ket characterized by cost-internalization, firms would be forced to adopt such innovative practices.
196 BROWN ET AL., supra note 183, at 65.
197 Id. at 69.
198 Id. at 136.
'99 Id. at 66-67.
200 See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039, 2041-42 (1993).
201 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
198 [hereinafter GATT].
202 Most trade agreements provide explicit exceptions for certain categories of regulation. For in-
stance, GATT allows nations to restrict import of goods produced in another country by prison labor.
GATT, supra note 201, at 61 Stat. A- 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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While their contribution to the rise of the global economy is undisputed,
free trade agreements have more recently come under fire from environmen-
talists for their apparent subversion of domestic environmental policies. In a
series of rulings, GATT and WTO panels struck down U.S. regulations fa-
cially intended to serve environmental purposes as unduly restrictive of
trade. 03 The most widely discussed of these rulings concerned a U.S. prohi-
bition on imports of tuna harvested by techniques, such as drift net harvest-
ing, that result in large numbers of incidental deaths to dolphins.10 4 Because
the U.S. regulation purported to restrict imported tuna according to the
method by which the tuna had been harvested, a GATT panel determined that
the legislation was not "primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins,"205
but rather was intended to confer an unfair trade advantage on the U.S. fish-
ing industry or, at a minimum, to force extraterritorial application of U.S. en-
vironmental regulations. 20 6 The panel declined to apply Article XX(g) of
GATT, which provides an exception for trade restrictions "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources," or to apply Article XX(b),
which provides an exception for restrictions "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health,"207 reasoning that other, less restrictive meas-
ures were available to the United States to pursue its conservationist goals.
The dolphin-tuna ruling rested on the fifty-year-old language and vi-
sion of GATT which reflects, on a global scale, the "cowboy economy"
concept identified by Boulding. Indeed, an explicit goal of GATT, as ex-
pressed in its Preamble, is to "[promote] a large and steadily growing vol-
ume of real income and effective demand, develop[] the full use of the
resources of the world and expand[] the production and exchange of
goods.""2 8 These aspirations reflect various aspects of growth economics
that ecological economists have challenged: namely, the belief that natural
resources can be put to "full use" by humans without destroying the bio-
physical integrity of the earth; the belief that "steadily growing" demand
can be attained without causing population and consumption levels to ex-
ceed sustainable or even desirable limits; and the belief that production can
be "expand[ed]" infinitely without concern for depleting natural resource
inputs or overtaxing the absorptive capacities of ecosystems with pollution
outputs. Even Article XX of GATT, which acknowledges the need to ex-
203 See Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate
Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1129,
1137-69 (1999) (reviewing rulings).
204 See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B I.S.D. 39S/155
205 See id. at para. 5.33.
206 See id.; see also Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839, 897 (ruling on related aspects of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
and noting that under GATT nations cannot "[f]orce other countries to change their policies within their
own jurisdictions").
207 GATT, supra note 201, at 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
208 GATT, supra note 201, at Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194.
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empt environmental protection efforts from trade liberalization obliga-
tions, 209 treats the conflict between economic and ecological goals as a nar-
row one requiring only a simple carve-out for environmental legislation, as
if the two goals generally exist in separate, unrelated spheres. In other
words, GATT overlooks the more fundamental relationship between eco-
nomic activity and ecosystem functioning.
With the institution of the WTO, however, the international community
has shifted its view toward the conception of a spaceman economy. The
Preamble to the WTO proclaims the body's commitment to the "optimal
use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so. ' '211 In addition, the WTO established in
1994 a Committee on Trade and Environment, which makes recommenda-
tions regarding "the need for rules to enhance the positive interaction be-
tween trade and environment measures, for the promotion of sustainable
development." '  These institutional changes soon began to inform deci-
sions by the Appellate Panel of the WTO in its review of foreign-nation
challenges to domestic environmental legislation. 2 2 For instance, in re-
viewing a U.S. ban on shrimp imports from countries that did not imple-
ment certain sea turtle conservation measures, the Appellate Panel took
pains to point out that it "had not decided that the protection and preserva-
tion of the environment is of no significance to the Members of the
WTO. ' 2 13 Many international trade and development scholars have inter-
preted the ruling as a sign of growing recognition within the WTO of the
importance of harmonizing economic and ecological activity.
214
If society's goal is to achieve sustainability, or otherwise regulate its
scale, the WTO's recognition of the interrelationship between economic ac-
tivity and the environment should be encouraged. Many of the regulatory
proposals examined in this Article may have dampening effects on global
trade by requiring the internalization of costs that previously have been ex-
ternalized. For instance, extended producer responsibility, which requires
manufacturers of consumer products to accept return of products and pack-
aging upon expiration of their useful lives, could be characterized as a re-
straint on trade that favors domestic producers. Foreign producers from
nations lacking comparable laws may not have access to the durable materi-
als and efficient technologies that flourish under extended-producer respon-
209 See supra text accompanying note 207.
210 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1144.
211 GATT Ministerial Declaration on Trade and Environment, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1267, 1268
(1994).
212 See Ala'i, supra note 203, at 1154-69.
213 Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58/AB/R, at para. 185.
214 See, e.g., Ala'i, supra note 203, at 1169.
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sibility laws and may therefore be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-
A-vis domestic producers.215 Similarly, in the case of ecological tax reform,
governments may need to impose tariffs on imports from nations that do not
impose comparable environmental regulations in order to discourage pro-
ducers from fleeing to "pollution havens. '216 Like extended producer re-
sponsibility laws, these tariffs may be subject to challenge under existing
principles of international trade.
For this reason, the exceptions contained in Article XX of GATT for
regulations "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,"
or "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health"217 should be
reaffirmed by the WTO member nations in a manner that removes doubt
concerning the international legality of ecological economic reforms. As
Daly argues, such a reaffirmation would be perfectly consistent with the
economic logic of free trade. The purpose of trade liberalization agree-
ments, from an economic perspective, is to prevent unfair government sup-
port of domestic industries or "the protection of an inefficient domestic
industry from competition with more efficient foreign firms." ' The pur-
pose of ecological economic reforms, including import tariffs that equalize
domestic and foreign goods under such reforms, is to "protect[] an efficient
national policy of cost internalization against standards-lowering competi-
tion from countries that, for whatever reason, do not count all environ-
mental and social costs. '219  Thus, both free trade agreements and
ecological economic reforms aim to achieve efficiency by prohibiting cer-
tain market failures caused by the government. The former prohibits mar-
ket distortions caused by government interference while the latter targets
government failure to interfere. In either case, the goal is to attain alloca-
tive efficiency through accurate pricing.
2. Affluence.-As one can see, a significant number of policy rec-
ommendations aim to influence society's ecological impact by enhancing
the technological efficiency with which society consumes resources.
Scholars have completed far less work in relation to the issues of affluence
and population, the remaining determinants of society's ecological impact.
There are at least two important reasons for this disparity. First, the task of
designing policy instruments to remedy market failures and encourage
technological advancements is a familiar one. Most of the tools described
in the previous section are variations on principles that long have been
known to economists and policymakers. Second, the task of restricting per-
capita consumption and population levels raises deeply moral issues about
215 Cf. Salzman, supra note 192, at 1283-85 (noting that "added costs and inferior bargaining
power" may pose a de facto trade barrier to foreign producers).
216 See supra text accompanying note 177.
217 See GATT, supra note 201, at 61 Stat. A-1 1,55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
218 DALY, supra note 43, at 147.
219 Id.
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which economics has been largely agnostic. To the extent that growth-
economic concepts currently dominate policymaking discussions, therefore,
lawmakers and the public have not recognized an urgent need to implement
programs relating to consumption and population levels.
Ecological economists argue, however, that technological advances in
resource efficiency alone cannot limit ecological impact when both con-
sumption and population levels are rising. As Gro Harlem Brundtland,
former Prime Minister of Norway, stated:
It is simply impossible for the world as a whole to sustain a Western level of
consumption for all. In fact, if seven billion people were to consume as much
energy and resources as we do in the West today we would need ten worlds,
not one to satisfy all our needs.220
Despite impressive improvements in resource productivity over the last few
decades, growth in both consumption and population levels has caused so-
ciety's overall use of resources to outpace efficiency advances: "From
1970 to 1990, average energy intensity fell in OECD countries by 20%, yet
total energy consumption grew by 25% and greenhouse emissions grew by
15%.' '221 In short, the implication of the I = P x A x T equation is that,
unless science is about to fashion a technological substitute for the earth it-
self, consumption and population levels must be controlled in order to limit
ecological impact.
a. Natural Resource Depletion Quotas.-With respect to con-
sumption levels, the policy instruments described above are insufficient by
themselves to restrict the volume of resource use that occurs within a soci-
ety. While improvements in the information-providing and cost-
internalizing functions of the market can vastly improve the quality of mar-
ket decisionmaking, only more stringent controls can directly affect the to-
tal quantity of consumption that society undertakes. Put differently, in light
of the practical difficulty of identifying and pricing environmental external-
ities and the logical impossibility of using discounting as a means of inter-
generational resource distribution,222 Pigouvian taxes alone cannot resolve
the problem of scale. Instead, in order to achieve an ecologically sustain-
able level of consumption, society must turn to mechanisms outside of the
traditional economic policy spectrum.
The first such mechanism developed by ecological economists ad-
dresses the need to set an absolute limit to the amount of natural resources
that an economy consumes in a given time period. In addition to the crea-
tion of certain environmental externalities that can be addressed through
220 Salzman, supra note 192, at 1245-46 (quoting Brundtland).
221 Id. at 1268 n. 114 (quoting NICK ROBINS & SARAH ROBERTS, RETHINKING PAPER CONSUMPTION
8 (Norwegian Ministry of Environment, Commissioned by OECD Work Program on Sustainable Pro-
duction and Consumption, 1996)).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 60-77.
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ecological tax reform,223 extraction and consumption of natural resources
poses an internal analytical problem due to the nonrenewable or exhausti-
ble characteristic of many of those resources. When a fossil fuel or other
nonrenewable resource is exploited, it is treated as current income under
national accounting principles such as GDP, even though it actually repre-
sents a depletion of nonrenewable natural capital.22 4 In nonaccounting
parlance, society treats extraction of the resource as regularly reproducible
activity, rather than conversion of an irreplaceable share of humanity's
one-time endowment of natural wealth. This misconception is what
prompted Georgescu-Roegen to warn that current use of steel, petroleum,
and other nonrenewable resources necessarily forecloses their use by fu-
ture generations.225
Daly proposes instituting a system of depletion quotas that would as-
sist both in reconceptualizing the role of natural resources in human activ-
ity and in providing a concrete policy tool for ensuring long-term
sustainable exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable energy sources.
The general rule under such a system would be "to deplete nonrenewables
at a rate equal to the rate of development of renewable substitutes. '226
The government would set aggregate nonrenewable production levels "so
that the resulting price of the nonrenewable resource is at least as high as
the price of its nearest renewable substitute. 227 By linking nonrenewable
resource use with the generation of viable renewable substitutes, Daly's
depletion quota would make sustainability a direct aim of production
rather than merely a hoped-for side effect. For nonrenewables that lack
viable substitutes, the level of production would be set by regulators in a
manner that reflects a fundamentally ethical judgment regarding the rela-
tive value of consumption by present versus future generations. Renew-
able resources also would be subject to a depletion quota system, but
would be somewhat easier to quantify: "For renewables, the quota should
be set at an amount equivalent to some reasonable calculation of maxi-
mum sustainable yield. 228
Once these levels have been determined, the government would auc-
tion off the appropriate number of depletion quota rights to intermediate
buyers who could then sell the rights to producers in a competitive resource
223 See supra text accompanying notes 1 61-81.
224 Similarly, when an exhaustible resource is harvested at unsustainable levels, the proceeds repre-
sent in part a conversion of capital stock, not income.
225 See Georgescu-Roegen, supra note 34, at 85 ("The upshot is clear. Every time we produce a
Cadillac, we irrevocably destroy an amount of low entropy that could otherwise be used for producing a
plow or a spade. In other words, every time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost of decreasing the
number of human lives in the future.").
226 DALY, supra note 43, at 82.
227 Herman E. Daly, The Steady-State Economy: Toward a Political Economy of Biophysical Equi-
librium and Moral Growth, in VALUING THE EARTH, supra note 28, at 325, 344.
228 Id.
HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 718 2002-2003
Law, Environment, and Vision
market, thereby causing little or no allocative distortion in the resource af-
termarket. 229 Such a system simultaneously would represent a partial reali-
zation of the ideal tax on land rent proposed by economist Henry George.230
Unlike the current practice of free or below-market resource giveaways by
the government, 231 a depletion quota would capture unearned scarcity rent
through public auction, allowing such revenue to be used for the national
benefit rather than private enrichment. 232 The system also might further en-
hance the efficiency with which society uses natural resources by providing
incentives for the development of resource-saving technologies and effi-
cient manufacturing processes, and by helping to spur the creation of com-
modities markets for recycled materials.2
33
Daly's proposed substantive rules explicitly adopt sustainability as
the optimal scale of human economic activity. However, recognition of
the concept of scale does not require one to accept automatically the norm
of sustainability. 234 For instance, one might argue that Daly's rule with
respect to nonrenewables is too stringent because it essentially makes
market actors indifferent between nonrenewables and renewable substi-
tutes. In other words, bearing in mind the impact of present consumption
on resource availability for future generations, one nevertheless might be-
lieve that humanity's finite endowment of nonrenewables should be util-
ized at some positive rate greater than the rate of renewable substitutes'
development. The important point is that a political debate between pro-
ponents of Daly's strong sustainability and proponents of some less strin-
gent level of control would represent precisely the type of democratic
discussion that society should be having and that, as noted at the outset,
235
it currently is not having with respect to its environmental policymaking.
By recognizing the need to monitor absolute levels of resource consump-
tion and by devising a policy instrument that requires legislative judgment
about such levels, the ecological economic approach brings such vital is-
sues to the fore.236
229 See Daly, supra note 227, at 348.
230 See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (4th ed. 1904).
231 See supra text accompanying notes 141-54.
232 See Daly, supra note 227, at 343. An advisable use of part of the increased public revenue
would be to provide wealth transfers to lower income people to help offset the regressive effect of
higher resource prices. See supra text accompanying note 169.
233 See Daly, supra note 227, at 343.
234 See supra text accompanying note 43.235 See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
236 It should also be emphasized that, whatever one's substantive judgment of the optimal scale of
economic activity, a policy device such as the depletion quota system is still necessary to give effect to
that judgment. Similarly, whatever one's view of the optimal amount of redistribution society should
make to redress inequality, some mechanism such as the tax-and-transfer system is necessary to achieve
the selected level of redistribution.
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In sum, the advantage that Daly's system adds to the use of ecologi-
cal tax reform is a more direct means of regulating scale in recognition
of society's limited ability to quantify and incorporate diffuse market
externalities into resource taxes. While ecological tax reform appears
promising as a tool to internalize some tangible costs of market side ef-
fects, such as pollution, Daly's quota system seems necessary to con-
strain the more direct consequences of market activity, such as
depletion. Put differently, ecological taxes discourage the use of natural
resources for ends less beneficial than the full social cost of resource
consumption, thereby achieving allocative efficiency. They are limited
in their effect, however, by the incompleteness of scientific knowledge
regarding the extent and effect of environmental externalities, by the
lack of consensus regarding ethically appropriate mechanisms for valu-
ing environmental goods and services, and by the inability of discount
rates to serve as a proxy for questions of intergenerational resource dis-
tribution. Depletion quotas circumvent these conceptual flaws by di-
rectly restricting aggregate resource consumption to levels reflecting
both a social judgment regarding the distribution of resources between
present and future generations and a degree of caution regarding human-
ity's ability to predict and measure the ecological consequences of eco-
nomic activity. Depletion quotas thereby assist society in maintaining a
desirable scale of resource use.
Neither ecological taxes nor depletion quotas are sufficient, by them-
selves, to achieve an economy that is optimal in both its efficiency and its
scale. In other words, market-corrective policies must influence both tech-
nology and affluence in order to regulate the supply side of the human
macroeconomy.
b. Limits to Competitive Consumption.-A second set of policy
proposals that might aid in constraining consumption levels focuses on the
demand side of the macroeconomy. These policies emerge from work by
Richard McAdams on the phenomenon of relative preferences-which are
those preferences that are defined in relation to the attributes or posses-
sions of other individuals.237 McAdams examines the way in which such
preferences can lead to socially wasteful, competitive consumption.238
For instance, if both A and B desire to own the largest sport-utility vehicle
on the block, their mutually exclusive preferences can lead to a consump-
tion "arms race," in which each makes a steadily greater investment in be-
hemoth SUVs that cancels the effect of the other's investment. Similarly,
if both A and B desire to send their child to the best college in the country,
237 Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). For other discussions of
such interdependent preferences, see ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND (1985); FRED
HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976); Robert A. Pollak, Interdependent Preferences, 66 AM.
ECON. REv. 309 (1976).
238 McAdams, supra note 237, at 5.
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they might make increasingly greater and earlier investments in their
child's pre-college education. 39
Such investments become wasteful when they divert resources away
from the satisfaction of other, nonrelative preferences. 240 For instance, con-
sider a case in which A and B are two coworkers, each vying for a promo-
tion and each facing a choice between purchasing an ordinary pair of work
pants and a pair that are made "wrinkle-free," through the application of
formaldehyde in a process that is potentially harmful to textile workers. 241
Both would prefer to purchase pants that do not carry a risk of harm to
workers, absent concerns about appearances. Their need to be perceived as
wearing neatly pressed attire, however, sets up a Prisoner's Dilemma in
which both A and B will choose the potentially toxic pants in order to avoid
lower appearance status in the competition for a promotion. The dilemma
lies in the fact that the degree of wrinkling of one's clothing is a relatively
observable attribute, while the harm caused to workers in their production is
not. As a result, the utility gained from purchasing non-wrinkle-free pants
does not contribute to one's relative appearance status. Some form of col-
lective agreement, therefore, is necessary to constrain A and B from pur-
chasing wrinkle-free pants when both might prefer the state of the world in
which wrinkled, nontoxic pants prevail.
McAdams identifies three ways in which governments may help re-
strict the incidence of such competitive consumption. First, governments
may tax the consumption of relative goods as a means of raising revenue to
satisfy other nonrelative social needs.242 This approach is advantageous be-
cause it can lower the consumption volume of certain status goods with
minimal macroeconomic distortion. For example, if the government levied
an excise tax on diamonds, people might simply buy smaller diamonds that
were equal in price to those that they would have purchased prior to the
tax.243 Second, governments may mandate the consumption of non-relative
goods that might otherwise be sacrificed in favor of wasteful competitive
consumption.244 Minimal standards for automobile safety represent a good
239 See Jonathan Kaufman, Grade Inflation: Suburban Parents Shun Many Public Schools, Even
the Good Ones, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1996, at Al (describing costly and escalating efforts by parents to
confer academic distinction on their children). As McAdams notes, these individual "arms races" are
simply components of the consumer's effort to obtain an overall mix of positional goods that signifies
success; consumers "purchase a combination of status goods in order to 'produce' a single commodity
of overall social distinction or prestige." McAdams, supra note 237, at 70 (quoting George J. Stigler &
Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 76,84,88 (1977).
240 See McAdams, supra note 237, at 55-56.
241 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (1996) (providing Occupational Safety and Health Administration
standards for occupational exposure to formaldehyde); OSHA, STANDARD INTERPRETATION AND
COMPLIANCE LETTERS: FORMALDEHYDE STANDARD CLARIFICATION (1989) (noting possibility of
higher formaldehyde concentrations in wrinkle-free fabrics).
242 See McAdams, supra note 237, at 72-76.
243 See id. at 75.
244 Id. at 76-79.
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example of this type of regulation, as do rules requiring minimum con-
sumption levels of "health insurance, pensions, vacation time, and work-
place democracy. 2 4 Finally, governments may enact policies designed to
foster social norms against competitive consumption.2 46 For instance, at-
taching civil liability to SUV owners for the nonreciprocal risk posed by
their vehicles to other drivers247 might serve to express social disapproval of
such vehicles.
The benefit of these policies from an ecological economic perspective
lies in the fact that luxury goods often exact a significant environmental
toll. The diminutive nature of precious metals and stones, for instance,
scarcely suggests the ecological cost that is required to produce them. Ex-
traction of metal ore for two gold wedding rings produces six tons of waste
at mining sites. 248 Similarly, 110 tons of such "overburden" earths are ex-
cavated to produce just one ton of copper.249 Once the ore is separated from
overburden, it is doused with potentially harmful chemicals, including cya-
nide, mercury, and sulfuric acid, producing a resultant waste known as "tail-
ings. 250 Given the nature of this process, any policy that would reduce the
size of jewelry necessary to achieve a given level of social status may be
desirable not only due to its public revenue generation, but also due to its
reduction in the sheer volume of global mining activities.
Other goods and services that on a global scale would be considered
luxury items produce similar environmentally destructive consequences. Air
travel requires forty percent more fuel than automobiles on a per-passenger,
per-kilometer basis.251 Each kilogram of red meat requires three thousand li-
ters of water, the equivalent of two liters of gasoline in petrochemicals and
other farm inputs, and five kilograms of corn and meal that otherwise could
be used to feed humans.212 The fickle fashion industry which, according to
the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, changed high-fashion trends
nearly five times a year during the 1980s, often prompts the disposal of cloth-
ing years before the end of its useful life.253 Such increased textile production
carries a heavy environmental cost, including the use of pesticides and water
for cotton farming, chemicals for synthetic fabric production, intense grazing
245 Id. at 77.
246 See id. at 79-83.
247 See Gregory L. White, Car/Truck Crash Emphasis Should Be Side-Impact Protection, Producers
Say, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1998, at B5 ("Government and auto-company statistics have shown that peo-
ple in cars that are struck by light trucks and SUVs are far more likely to be seriously injured or killed
than if they were hit by cars.").
248 GARY GARDNER & PAYAL SAMPAT, Forging a Sustainable Materials Economy, in STATE OF




252 See id. at 68.
253 See id. at 95.
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for wool and leather, and hazardous industrial dyes for coloration.25 4
Despite the heavy burden luxury-goods consumption seems to place on
the environment, such consumption may in fact provide only fleeting en-
joyment to its practitioners. Seeking satisfaction that many argue may be
derived more reliably from nonmaterial sources such as social companion-
ship, physical health, and mental stimulation,255 the competitive consumer
continually trades in goods for the latest model with the latest features. The
consumer desires simply to possess something that relatively few others are
capable of attaining, an observable symbol that signifies success under pre-
vailing social norms. By adopting policies designed to restrict the "arms
race" of competitive consumption, governments not only could help reduce
the incidence of environmental destruction that frequently attends such con-
sumption, but could also steer consumers toward an emphasis on what
many believe are stronger determinants of psychological welfare.
c. Limits to Total Consumption.-Policies addressing natural
resource exploitation and competitive consumption nevertheless may be in-
sufficient to form the entire basis of an ecological economic approach to per
capita material consumption levels. Because these policies do not address
the problem of regulating consumption by all members of society for all
material resources, their use may not necessarily keep total ecological im-
pact within an environmentally acceptable range. In such an event, Daly
would require society to confront the philosophical task of defining and
limiting its members to "a level of per capita wealth sufficient for a good
life" that remains consistent with the ecological needs of the earth. 256 Daly
would thus ask society to utilize the regulatory power of the state to set per
capita material throughput limits at a level within the best scientific esti-
mate of ecological carrying capacities-an admittedly radical concept in the
context of an economic tradition that believes the good of society is best
served by exalting the right of individual market actors to collect and con-
sume as they see fit.
To be precise, the total impact that a society exerts on its ecological
base should be the focus of the limitation. Daly implicitly assumes that
people would opt for an egalitarian distribution of such an impact quota. A
society could just as easily, however, regulate aggregate rather than indi-
vidual impact. It could, for instance, create a large-scale, zero-sum game by
directly capping aggregate impact while allowing unregulated allocation of
individual impact "rights." The resulting competition could lead to dispari-
ties in distribution, much like the current U.S. economy. Unlike the current
economy, however, the system would be designed so that aggregate impact
254 See id. at 96.
255 See Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of Consumer
Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 895-98 (2002) (reviewing sources).
256 See DALY, supra note 43, at 14.
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levels, taking account of the existing population size and the level of tech-
nological efficiency, remain within ecological constraints.
3. Population.-From the perspective of the cowboy economy, produc-
tion is limited by labor rather than natural resources. Any increase in popula-
tion size therefore can be seen as a desirable addition to the labor supply.
However, the perspective of the spaceman economy reveals an inverse rela-
tionship between population growth and permissible levels of affluence .57 A
.smaller population can maintain higher consumption levels than a larger one,
keeping ecological impact constant. Because total ecological impact must be
limited in the spaceman economy, any policy that fosters reproductive growth
therefore can be seen as one that restricts individuals to a lower standard of
consumption. Given such a relationship,. policymakers must examine means by
which societies may both ethically and effectively regulate population sizes. In
recent years, legal scholars have begun doing just that.25
a. Domestic Population Policy.-As a threshold matter, it is
important to dispel the popular notion that overpopulation is a matter of
concern only to developing nations. Because both population size and per-
capita resource intensity affects ecological impact, the United States turns
out to be the most "overpopulated" nation on earth.259 At the request of the
Earth Council in preparation for the Rio+5 Forum, scientist Mathis Wack-
ernagel used an innovative measure known as the "ecological footprint" to
estimate the ecological impact of the world's nations.260 This measure cal-
culates the area of biologically productive land and water necessary to pro-
duce the resources consumed and to assimilate the wastes generated by a
given population at a specified material standard of living. Recent data on
ecological footprint analysis shows that Americans lead the most resource-
intensive lifestyles on earth, requiring 10.3 hectares of biologically produc-
tive space per person.26' In light of the fact that the average Indian only
utilizes 0.5 hectares, the total ecological footprint of India, the most popu-
lous nation on earth, is less than one-third the size of the U.S. footprint.2 62
257 See supra text accompanying note 137.
258 For instance, two provocative symposia recently have been devoted to the topic. See Paula
Abrams, From Malthus to the Millennium: Population Law and Policy, 27 ENVTL. L. 1091 (1997) (in-
troducing symposium); Timothy E. Wirth, Population-Challenges and Alternatives, 6 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 245 (1995) (same).
259 See Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion: Why We Should Care and
What We Should Do About It, 27 ENVTL. L. 1187, 1190-91 (1997).
260 MATHIS WACKERNAGEL ET AL., ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINTS OF NATIONS: How MUCH NATURE
DO THEY USE? HOW MUCH NATURE DO THEY HAVE? (1997). Wackemagel's collaborator William
Rees had suggested the concept of "ecological footprints" as early as 1992. See William E Rees, Eco-
logical Footprints and Appropriated Carrying Capacity, 4 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 121 (1992).
261 Redefining Progress, Updated Ranking List (1997), available at http://www.rprogress.org/
resources/nip/ef/ef nationstable.html.
262 Id. (calculating total footprint of India at 7,761,840 square kilometers and the U.S. at 27,623,467
square kilometers).
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Indeed, the total U.S. footprint is nearly twice as large as that of China, the
next largest consumer of the Earth's ecologically productive area.263 These
figures demonstrate that, unless Americans dramatically alter their con-
sumption habits, population control is an issue of both international and
domestic relevance.
On the domestic front, Mona Hymel has argued that U.S. tax policy
should be reformed to eliminate its arguably pronatalist bias.2 64 The de-
pendency exemption, head-of-household filing status, earned income tax
credit, and child care credit policies all operate to lower the cost of repro-
duction, thereby raising incentives to have children at the margin.2 65 In
contrast, Hymel advocates the institution of policies that would promote
factors highly correlated with reduced fertility rates. Tax subsidization of
public education and family planning programs, for instance, arguably
could help to increase female educational levels and access to birth control
technologies, both of which help to lower fertility rates.2 66 More directly,
tax-preferred savings plans and other forms of incentives and penalties
could be redesigned so that they are expressly contingent on family size.267
Hymel recognizes that such tax reform would influence population levels
only indirectly; nevertheless, she believes that the effect would be signifi-
cant enough to merit a serious reassessment of the role that tax policy plays
in the growth of the U.S. population.2 68
b. International Population Policy.-Far more direct confronta-
tion of population levels seems necessary in developing nations, where fer-
tility rates are as many as four children above the rate necessary to keep
population levels constant.2 69 Traditionally, policymakers have supported
two divergent approaches to population regulation in developing nations.
First, some policymakers have argued that "development is the best contra-
ceptive 27 ° because economic growth theoretically will reduce the demand
263 See id. (calculating China's total footprint at 14,967,780 square kilometers). To put the figures
in perspective, consider the following statistic based on oil equivalent commercial energy use: "[Tjhe
average African couple would have to have more than ninety children to equal the environmental impact
from commercial energy use of a corresponding American couple with two children." Judith E
Jacobsen, Population, Consumption, and Environmental Degradation: Problems and Solutions, 6
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 255, 270 (1995).
264 Hymel, supra note 145.
265 See id. at 55-68.
266 Id. at 68-73.
267 Id. at 72-75.
268 Id. at 132.
269 See Ehrlich & Ehrlich, supra note 259, at 1198. In recent years, signs of a trend toward declin-
ing birth rates have emerged even among many developing nations. See Diana D.M. Babor, Population
Growth and Reproductive Rights in International Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 83, 86-87
(1999). Nevertheless, the dynamics of population growth indicate that humans will continue to rise in
numbers for generations after such a decline. See id. at 87.
270 Paula Abrams, Population Control and Sustainability: It's the Same Old Song But with a Different
Meaning, 27 ENVTL. L. 1111 (1997) (describing motto of 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference).
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for children by shifting society from an agrarian to an urban-industrial cen-
ter. Second, others have argued in favor of family planning programs, be-
cause access to birth control technologies and education will act as a
"supply side" solution to the problem of overpopulation by providing a safe
means of reducing pregnancy rates. 27 1  Neither of these approaches has
proven an unqualified success. Family planning efforts too often have been
associated with the coercive programs conducted by nations such as China,
India, 272 Brazil, and Indonesia,273 while economic development has proven
insufficiently correlated with reduced fertility to provide the "magic bullet"
that demographers and economists hoped it would be. 274  An additional
problem with the economic development approach is that it often has
meant, in practice, resource-intensive industrialization. In other words, sta-
bilization of population arrives only at the cost of increases in per capita
ecological impact, with an uncertain net effect.
In more recent years, social development theorists have championed a
promising third approach that offers a refined analysis of the interplay be-
tween development and fertility.27 These theorists reject the view that eco-
nomic development invariably reduces birth rates. Instead, they attempt to
unravel the specific factors associated with development that lead to re-
duced fertility rates, so that policymakers can target those factors in particu-
lar. Under their analysis, two key determinants of low fertility rates are the
educational level of women and their ability to participate in society outside
of the home.2 76 More generally, "social development theorists argue that
the critical factors in the reduction of fertility rates are increases in the
status, education, and economic power of women." '277
By the 1994 World Population Conference in Cairo, social develop-
ment theorists offered a "significant body of research demonstrating that
birth rates are dramatically affected by social, rather than economic, devel-
opment. 2 78 In response, 160 nations adopted the Cairo Programme of Ac-
tion, which links reproductive health to basic human rights and which
requires nations "to make long-term investments in education, health care,
and social policy that ultimately will affect the motivational factors relating
to high fertility rates. '279 This new approach to population control improves
271 Id. at 1118.
272 Robert M. Hardaway, Environmental Malthusianism: Integrating Population and Environ-
mental Policy, 27 ENVTL. L. 1209, 1235 (1997).
273 See Ehrlich & Ehrlich, supra note 259, at 1197.
274 Id. at 1199.
275 Id.; see also Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035, 1048 (1996).
276 Ehrlich & Ehrlich, supra note 259, at 1199.
277 Abrams, supra note 270, at 1118.
27 Id. at 1124.
279 Id. (quoting Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Dept.
of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994)), available
at gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/ungopherspopin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.txt.
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earlier efforts by international and domestic agencies because it expressly
condemns fertility-related human rights violations while sharpening the focus
of policies that seek to foster development among third-world nations.
This refinement should come as welcome news to environmentalists,
who have traditionally remained silent on the issue of overpopulation given
its link to divisive questions of reproductive rights and its historical associa-
tion with coercive programs of bodily intrusion. 280 Nevertheless, environ-
mentalists and human rights advocates in some sense have been engaged in
parallel struggles: environmentalists seek to overturn a vision of humanity
as the unchecked dominator of nature, while human rights activists seek to
overturn a similar vision of governments as the rightful dominators of
women.2 81 Through the insights of social development theorists, these par-
allel aims form a joint goal of stabilizing populations by achieving greater
gender equity. Indeed, the consensus reached at Cairo shows that "[t]he
most effective solution to the population problem also happens to be the
most ethical. '2 82
C. Summary
Beginning with the simple proposition that natural systems are limited
in their ability to generate resources and absorb wastes, ecological econom-
ics unfolds into a panoply of heretofore unrecognized or underappreciated
legal and public policy goals. As this Part demonstrates, the tools to
achieve these goals are beginning to take shape in a variety of different aca-
demic literatures. Scholars have proposed several market-corrective actions
that society can take to internalize, at least approximately, the environ-
mental costs of economic activity, such as the elimination of natural re-
source-extraction subsidies, the shifting of the tax burden from socially
desirable activities to ecologically harmful ones, and the reformation of
consumer product markets by internalizing tangible product costs. The
regulation of trade between nations also has been examined through the lens
of ecological economics, suggesting ways to harmonize current global mar-
ket policies with domestic environmental regulations.
The question of how to regulate population and consumption levels has
received less attention in the literature. To this point, the main contribution
made by ecological economists has been to highlight the fact that popula-
tion and consumption levels are legitimate subjects of collective attention.
Ecological economists promote this awareness by disaggregating the de-
terminants of environmental impact into factors of technology, population,
and consumption. While economic incentives to increase technological ef-
ficiency are theoretically familiar, policies designed to constrain absolute
levels of consumption and population are both unfamiliar and controversial.
280 See Hardaway, supra note 272, at 1228.
281 See Abrams, supra note 270, at 1133.
282 Id. at 1134.
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As a result, scholars have spoken only generally about the need to limit the
volume of resource extraction and competitive consumption. With respect
to population levels, policies that increase educational and social opportuni-
ties for women appear to represent the most promising alternative for low-
ering reproduction rates.
The sweep of ecological economics within legal analysis is poten-
tially broad. The laws and policies of tax, trade, consumers, products li-
ability, and the environment all represent known areas of potential
application of ecological economic insights; many others remain to be
discovered. If the consensus of the world's scientific community turns
out to be correct-namely, that "grave threats imperil the future of hu-
manity and the global environment" 283-then the use of ecological eco-
nomic concepts within legal analysis will only become more fruitful and
more urgent as time passes.
CONCLUSION
The distinction between ecological and conventional economics is star-
tlingly simple: ecological economists view the human economy as a sub-
system of the environment, while conventional economists view the
environment as a subsystem of the economy. The former vision empha-
sizes natural constraints on the expansion of human production, including
both the scarcity of resource inputs to the economic process and the scarcity
of pollution Sinks to absorb waste outputs of the process. The latter vision
admits of no such limits on human economic growth, given that no concep-
tual superstructure, such as the environment, exists "around" the economy
to constrain it. Economic growth is limited only by the availability of hu-
man-made capital and labor, not by natural resources.
This elementary shift in preanalytic vision leads to surprisingly dra-
matic changes in policy recommendations. As leading ecological econo-
mist Herman Daly puts it, "[w]hen we draw a containing boundary of the
environment around the economy, we move from 'empty-world' economics
to 'full world' economics. Economic logic stays the same, but the per-
ceived pattern of scarcity changes radically and policies must be changed
radically. 2 84 Particularly, the goal of market regulation becomes more
complicated than merely seeking to maximize allocative efficiency. In ad-
dition to establishing market conditions that allow resources to be devoted
to their most valued use, governments also must moderate the absolute
scale of the human macroeconomy in light of the carrying capacity of the
relevant ecosystem.
283 Union of Concerned Scientists, World Scientists' Call for Action at the Kyoto Climate Summit
(1997) (statement of 1586 scientists from sixty-three countries, including 104 of the 178 living Nobel
Prize winners in the sciences).
284 DALY, supra note 16, at 50.
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This Article has argued that the ecological economists' notion of scale
not only demonstrates what is missing from some economic approaches to
environmental problems, but also helps to explain why a national discussion
regarding different visions of the environmental future did not accompany
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 2 5 Within a worldview that fails to
recognize ultimate repercussions to environmental pollution, one might jus-
tifiably question why Congress should pay any attention whatsoever to the
level of sulfur dioxide emissions permitted under the national trading
scheme. If one assumes a limitless ability of nature to absorb waste out-
puts, then the determination of aggregate emissions limits for any particular
environmental trading program becomes a judgment of little urgency.
Until the nation adopts a language that avoids both the absolute pro-
hibitivism of 1970s-era ethical environmentalism and the absolute permis-
sivism of the most bullish forms of growth economics, it will continue to
struggle in its efforts to mount a democratic discussion regarding environ-
mental quality. As this Article has argued, ecological economics provides
the necessary language. Just as efficiency has become a meta-principle in-
forming all areas of law and regulation, so too can the ecological econo-
mist's conception of scale. Indeed, if the ecological economists are correct
in their assessment that scale is a vital, though neglected, concept in eco-
nomics, then efficiency analysis by itself is nothing more than a one-bladed
scissors. An economy that puts an ever-increasing strain on its natural envi-
ronment may still allocate productive resources efficiently, but in doing so
it simply will be making the best of an increasingly desperate situation.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
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